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Fee-Shifting Statutes and Compensation for Risk
MAUREEN CARROLL*
A law firm that enters into a contingency arrangement provides the client with more
than just its attorneys’ labor. It also provides a form of financing, because the firm
will be paid (if at all) only after the litigation ends; and insurance, because if the
litigation results in a low recovery (or no recovery at all), the firm will absorb the
direct and indirect costs of the litigation. Courts and markets routinely pay for these
types of risk-bearing services through a range of mechanisms, including state feeshifting statutes, contingent percentage fees, common-fund awards, alternative fee
arrangements, and third-party litigation funding.
This Article mines those risk-compensation mechanisms for lessons about the
proper interpretation of federal fee-shifting statutes. Those statutes encourage
private plaintiffs to enforce a limited set of laws, including civil rights statutes, by
authorizing the court to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party.
Although a law firm cannot receive a court-ordered fee shift unless its client prevails,
current doctrine prohibits compensation for risk in federal fee-shifting awards. This
Article argues that this prohibition should be eliminated, and to that end, it evaluates
specific methods of including compensation for risk in federal fee-shifting awards.
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Litigation at the University of Texas School of Law. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the
generous support of the William W. Cook Endowment of the University of Michigan Law
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, each party to a civil lawsuit must generally pay for its own
representation, regardless of who ultimately wins or loses. To encourage the
enforcement of laws deemed to promote the public interest, such as civil rights
statutes, Congress has enacted fee-shifting provisions that create a set of exceptions
to this default rule.1 When a plaintiff is the “prevailing party” in an action to enforce
one of the laws specified in a fee-shifting statute, the court may order the defendant
to pay the plaintiff “a reasonable attorney’s fee.”2

1. See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 790–91
(2011); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 183, 205 (“Every significant contemporary civil rights statute contains some provision
for attorney’s fees . . . .”); Kathryn A. Sabbeth, What’s Money Got to Do with It?: Public
Interest Lawyering and Profit, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 441, 465 (2014). State legislatures have
enacted a number of fee-shifting statutes as well. See infra Section III.A.
2. Some statutory and contractual provisions authorize fee shifting for the benefit of the
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Statutory fee-shifting awards are meant to reflect the market value of the legal
services provided to the plaintiff,3 such that claimants can rely on the potential fee
award to obtain representation.4 Federal courts calculate these awards by multiplying
an attorney’s reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended on
the litigation, yielding a product known as the lodestar. Although these fee shifts are
contingent upon success, the hourly rates are based on the amount a law firm could
reasonably have charged under standard (i.e., noncontingent) hourly billing.5 In its
1992 decision in City of Burlington v. Dague, the Supreme Court held that courts
may not increase fee-shifting awards to reflect the law firm’s contingent risk of
nonpayment.6 More than twenty-five years later, that prohibition on contingency
enhancement still applies.7
To understand the impact of this prohibition, consider District of Columbia v.
Heller,8 in which the Supreme Court ultimately held by a one-vote margin that the
Second Amendment protected the plaintiff’s right to keep a handgun in his home.9
At the time the case was filed, that constitutional right had not been judicially
recognized,10 and it had been several decades since the Supreme Court had issued
any decision interpreting the Second Amendment.11 NRA leadership tried to prevent
the case from being filed because they questioned whether a majority of the Supreme
Court would rule in the plaintiff’s favor.12 In short, though it was ultimately

defendant, or for the benefit of either party. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517,
534 (1994) (holding that the Copyright Act authorizes two-way fee shifting at the district
court’s discretion). This Article focuses instead on federal fee-shifting statutes that authorize
an essentially one-way fee shift in favor of the plaintiff. Under these statutes, a defendant
generally cannot receive fees unless the plaintiff’s claim was “frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation.” Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 434
U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
3. E.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283 (1989) (“Our cases have repeatedly
stressed that attorney’s fees . . . are to be based on market rates for the services rendered.”).
4. For example, a fee-shifting provision enacted in 1976 applies in constitutional tort
litigation and several other types of civil rights cases. It provides that “[i]n any action or
proceeding to enforce” the specified provisions, “the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
5. This Article focuses on the compensation a law firm (including a solo practice or
public interest law organization) should receive for representing a particular client. It does not
address the distinct question of how much compensation an attorney should receive from her
employer or practice. Although an attorney’s salary or income can be affected by the
compensation her law firm receives for a particular case, it can also depend on a host of other
factors—like organizational structure, unionization, pension obligations, etc.—that would
serve to muddle rather than to illuminate the analysis I undertake here.
6. 505 U.S. 557, 567 (1992).
7. See infra Section II.D. Under many state fee-shifting statutes, however, contingency
enhancement remains available. See infra Section III.A.
8. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
9. Id. at 635.
10. See id. at 625–26 (asserting that the question “has been for so long judicially
unresolved” because “[f]or most of our history the question did not present itself”).
11. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1939).
12. See Adam Liptak, Carefully Plotted Course Propels Gun Case to Top, N.Y. TIMES
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successful, Heller was initially a high-risk case. Because of Dague, however, the feeshifting award could not exceed the amount the plaintiff’s counsel would have
received if the outcome had been certain from the start.13 A similar story could be
told about any number of landmark cases in which success initially appeared
uncertain.14
Litigation risk is present in run-of-the-mill cases as well. Consider a plaintiff who
was fired the day after she reported the defendant employer to the Department of
Labor for failure to pay overtime wages.15 Notwithstanding the eyebrow-raising
timing, the defendant might contend it fired her because of her job performance,
rather than out of retaliation. Her former supervisor (especially if still employed by
the defendant) might support that story. These circumstances could create a genuine
dispute of material fact, necessitating a trial;16 and because credibility determinations
belong to the finder of fact, the outcome of that trial could not be known in advance.17
Accordingly, regardless of the ultimate outcome, the claim would initially involve
some amount of risk.

(Dec. 3, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/03/us/03bar.html [https://perma.cc/2TQXEY9Q].
13. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 832 F. Supp. 2d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2011) (awarding
fees based on a reasonable number of hours multiplied by a reasonable noncontingent hourly
rate). The plaintiff’s attorneys in Heller sought a contingency enhancement, notwithstanding
their recognition that the argument was foreclosed by Dague:
No lawyer rationally undertakes, on a contingent basis, work that would yield the
same fee for the same work that could be earned without risk of non-payment.
Section 1988 commands that counsel be paid a “reasonable” fee, and it is patently
unreasonable to assign lawyers’ work zero premium for the risk of non-payment
in cases with substantial such risk.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees and
Costs, at 26 n.10, Heller v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370 (D.D.C. 2007) (No. 1:03-cv00213-EGS), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/heller-fee-memo-8-2
5-08.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XB7-SBS4].
14. For example, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013), ultimately enabled samesex couples to marry in California. Due to their views of its riskiness, however, major LGBT
advocacy groups believed at the time that it should not have been filed. See Chuleenan
Svetvilas, Challenging Prop 8: The Hidden Story, CAL. LAW. (Jan. 22, 2010), https://sdgln
.com/news/2010/01/22/challenging-prop-8-hidden-story [https://perma.cc/W8U2-DR7K].
15. Wage theft and retaliation are pervasive in the low-wage workforce. See Llezlie L.
Green, Wage Theft in Lawless Courts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1303, 1309–10 (2019); see also
Andrew Friedman & Deborah Axt, In Defense of Dignity, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 577,
577–78 (2010).
16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (providing for summary judgment in the absence of a
genuine dispute of material fact); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)–(b) (providing for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict only if no reasonable jury could have reached the verdict it did on
the basis of the evidence presented).
17. Warren F. Schwartz, Long-Shot Class Actions: Toward a Normative Theory of Legal
Uncertainty, 8 LEGAL THEORY 297, 299 (2002) (“[T]he different ‘priors’ that different juries
bring to bear in evaluating the evidence, rather than differences in the evidence itself, can lead
juries to decide identical cases differently.”).
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As the Court recognized in Dague itself, “no claim has a 100% chance of
success.”18 Accordingly, an attorney does not typically tell a client that she will
prevail in her lawsuit; rather, the attorney advises her as to whether she is likely to
prevail.19 Because of this ubiquitous risk, and because “[a]n hourly rate that is
payable only when one wins is worth less than the same hourly rate that is
guaranteed,”20 claimants currently face a structural impediment to securing
representation in civil rights litigation and other fee-shifting cases.21 As the Third
Circuit once put it, “[n]o one expects a lawyer whose compensation is contingent
upon his success to charge, when successful, as little as he would charge a client who
in advance had agreed to pay for his services, regardless of success.” 22 Because of
Dague, however, many civil rights plaintiffs can offer nothing more.23
A plaintiff who has already suffered a very large amount of damages will often
be able to hire counsel on the basis of a contracted-for contingent percentage fee,24

18. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 563 (1992). Moreover, even if a claim
were to have a 100% chance of success, it would not have a 100% chance of resulting in a feeshifting award. See infra Section I.A.
19. See Mark K. Osbeck, Lawyer As Soothsayer: Exploring the Important Role of
Outcome Prediction in the Practice of Law, 123 PENN ST. L. REV. 41, 43 (2018); see also
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESP. EC 7-5 (1971) (repealed 2018) (“A lawyer as adviser furthers
the interest of his client by giving his professional opinion as to what he believes would likely
be the ultimate decision of the courts on the matter at hand . . . .”) (emphasis added).
20. Charles Silver, Regulation of Fee Awards in the Fifth Circuit, 67 ADVOC. (TEX.) 36,
36 (2014).
21. See id. at 37 (“[T]he Supreme Court prohibited contingency enhancements in City of
Burlington v. Dague, thereby assuring that plaintiffs who have only fee awards to offer cannot
use the market for legal services effectively.”); see also Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang &
Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 678 (2013) (“A forprofit sector attorney weighing only economic considerations will not represent plaintiffs on
the expectation of a fee award if she also has the opportunity to be paid at a comparable rate,
in a timely fashion, and not contingent on prevailing.”); Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights
Practice in the 1990’s: The Dichotomy Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 197,
229 (1997) (“In the area of civil rights class actions, attorneys for plaintiffs described Dague
as the major factor limiting their practice.”).
22. Lindy Bros. Builders of Phila. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973) (quoting Cherner v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55, 61 (D.
Mass. 1963)); see also Morris A. Ratner & William B. Rubenstein, Profit for Costs, 63
DEPAUL L. REV. 587, 595 (2014) (“If contingent fee counsel were merely reimbursed at market
rates, few would undertake such work because they could get paid market rates in
noncontingent fee cases without such risk.”).
23. See infra Section II.D. Although the Court has prohibited risk enhancements, it has
authorized other upward adjustments to the lodestar, such as for delays in payment, see
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283–84 (1989), and for extraordinary performance by
counsel, see Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 554 (2010). Courts may also adjust the lodestar
downward for reasons like the extent of the plaintiff’s success. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 434–36 (1983).
24. Whether a particular damages amount would qualify as “large” or “small” may look
very different from the perspective of a law firm deciding whether to take a case (which is the
perspective referenced in the text) than from the perspective of the claimant seeking
representation. Many law firms would decline to take on a civil rights claim seeking $75,000
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regardless of whether a fee-shifting statute applies. 25 A plaintiff who seeks an
injunction to prevent those damages from accruing or increasing, however, will not
have that option. Structurally inadequate fee-shifting awards thus raise particularly
significant obstacles for plaintiffs who want to sue to prevent harm—to halt
enforcement of a regulation before it forces them to close their facilities,26 for
example, or to require a city to fix its infrastructure before the contaminated water
poisons their children.27
Congress should undo Dague, but if it does not, the Supreme Court can and should
do so instead. On the one hand, stare decisis has special force with respect to
decisions that, like Dague, involve statutory interpretation. Although the decision
was wrong from the start,28 mere incorrectness is not usually enough to overcome
stare decisis.29 On the other hand, changed circumstances reduce the force of stare
decisis, and the Supreme Court has specifically recognized that changes in the legal
market are an appropriate basis for modifying case law about fee-shifting statutes.30
A great deal has changed between 1992 and the present, both in the market for legal
services and in the profession’s understanding of that market. As this Article will
demonstrate, those subsequent developments have made the Court’s errors in Dague
more readily apparent.
The Supreme Court should acknowledge both those subsequent developments and
its original errors by overruling Dague. In light of the information now available, the

in damages, for example, even though that amount might represent more than five years of the
claimant’s gross income (e.g., if the claimant is working full time at the federal minimum wage
of $7.25 per hour). Cf. Paul D. Reingold, Requiem for Section 1983, 3 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 19 n.57 (2008) (reporting that the author’s law school clinic was “unable to
refer [fee-shifting] cases involving less than $100,000 in damages to the private bar”).
25. See infra Section II.A.1.
26. Cf. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016) (involving a
challenge to a statute that, if not enjoined, would have led to the closure of several medical
facilities).
27. Cf. Michigan Dep’t of Envtl. Quality v. City of Flint, 282 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1016
(E.D. Mich. 2017), reconsideration denied, 296 F. Supp. 3d 845 (E.D. Mich.), and
reconsideration dismissed, No. CV 17-12107, 2017 WL 8682365 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2017)
(involving an order to provide safe drinking water to the residents of Flint, Michigan).
28. The decision immediately drew criticism, especially with regard to its economic
analysis. See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46
VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1115 (1993) (agreeing with the outcome but arguing that “Justice Scalia’s
economic analysis in City of Burlington is unsound”); Charles Silver, Incoherence and
Irrationality in the Law of Attorneys’ Fees, 12 REV. LITIG. 301, 303 (1993) (arguing that the
decision “demonstrate[d] the Justices’ inability to handle basic economic issues correctly” and
“[could not] be defended on economic grounds”). Dague was not the first of the Supreme
Court’s statutory fee-shifting cases to garner such criticism. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The
Supreme Court on Attorney Fee Awards, 1985 and 1986 Terms: Economics, Ethics, and Ex
Ante Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 621, 638–39 (1988) (criticizing the “inconsistent and
unsophisticated Supreme Court uses of economic approaches” in earlier fee-shifting cases).
29. Justice Thomas recently argued that “[i]f a prior decision demonstrably erred in
interpreting such a law, federal judges should exercise the judicial power—not perpetuate a
usurpation of the legislative power—and correct the error.” Gamble v. United States, 139 S.
Ct. 1960, 1985 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring). That view, however, is an outlier.
30. See Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 556 (2010).
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difficult question is not whether statutory fee-shifting awards should include
compensation for risk, but how they should do so. Courts would surely balk at
replacing structurally inadequate fee-shifting awards with structurally exorbitant
ones. This Article thus takes up both the whether and the how questions.
In addressing those questions, this Article draws on the current state of knowledge
about legal markets and compensation for risk. Consider private-market contingency
fees. At the time of the Court’s decision in Dague, there was a “dearth of systematic
information on contingency fee legal practice.”31 The situation has since improved
immensely: Since the mid-1990s, research by Herbert Kritzer and other scholars has
yielded valuable information about the logistics and nature of contingent-fee
representation.32 As this work has shown, a law firm that enters into a contingent-fee
arrangement provides the client with more than just its attorneys’ labor.33 It also
provides a form of financing, because the firm will be paid (if at all) only after the
litigation ends, and insurance, because if the litigation results in a low recovery (or
no recovery at all), the firm will absorb both the direct and the indirect costs of the
litigation.34 The rates that law firms charge their contingent-fee clients include the
monetary value of the risk-bearing services they provide.35
In addition to contingent percentage fees, this Article examines state fee-shifting
statutes,36 common-fund awards to class counsel,37 the “alternative fee
arrangements” that for-profit law firms offer their clients,38 and nonrecourse, case-

31. Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Civil Justice
System: The Wisconsin Contingency Fee Study, 81 JUDICATURE 22, 26 (1997).
32. See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY
FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004) [hereinafter REPUTATIONS AND REWARDS];
Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: Dealing with the Possible but Not
Certain, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 337 (2011) [hereinafter Possible but Not Certain]; Stephen
Daniels & Joanne Martin, Texas Plaintiffs’ Practice in the Age of Tort Reform: Survival of the
Fittest—It’s Even More True Now, 51 N.Y.L.S. L. Rev. 285 (2006) [hereinafter Texas
Plaintiffs’ Practice]; Eric Helland, Daniel Klerman, Brendan Dowling & Alexander Kappner,
Contingent Fee Litigation in New York City, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1971 (2017); Herbert M.
Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47 DEPAUL L.
REV. 267, 309 (1998) [hereinafter Wages of Risk]; Jerry Van Hoy, Markets and Contingency:
How Client Markets Influence the Work of Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Lawyers, 6 INT’L J.
LEGAL PROF. 345 (1999); Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L.
REV. 183 (2001).
33. Although contingent-fee research has provided a richer empirical and theoretical basis
for understanding this aspect of contingent-fee practice, the basic insight has been around for
much longer. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90
YALE L.J. 473, 480 (1981) (“A lawyer who both bears the risk of not being paid and provides
legal services is not receiving the fair market value of his work if he is paid only for the second
of these functions. If he is paid no more, competent counsel will be reluctant to accept fee
award cases.”).
34. Kritzer, Wages of Risk, supra note 32, at 270.
35. See infra Section III.B.
36. See infra Section III.A.
37. See infra Section III.C.
38. See infra Section III.D.
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specific loans made by third-party litigation funders.39 Each of those contexts
involves a mechanism for compensating risk-bearing services associated with
litigation. This Article draws on the lessons of those contexts to evaluate options for
incorporating compensation for risk into federal statutory fee-shifting awards.40
The central implementation choice is between a uniform lodestar multiplier and
one determined on a case-specific basis. Case-specific risk multipliers would bear
more similarity to compensation for risk in other contexts, but they would raise
concerns about administrability, because they would require a court to estimate the
plaintiff’s initial likelihood of success.41 A uniform risk multiplier would not require
such an estimate, and thus would offer superior administrability, but would be more
of a blunt instrument.42 Each option has its pros and cons, but both are reasonable,
and either would significantly improve upon the status quo.
To be sure, the prohibition on compensation for risk is not the only obstacle to an
effective fee-shifting regime. Because of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
“prevailing party” requirement, a defendant might entirely avoid fee eligibility even
if the plaintiff receives all of the relief that she requested.43 Fee-shifting awards under
some statutes exclude expert witness fees, 44 even though experts can be both
expensive and necessary to a plaintiff’s success. Courts may deny fees when a
plaintiff recovers only nominal damages,45 even though no other relief is available
for some constitutional violations.46 The list could go on and on.47 Statutory fee
shifting has been suffering death by a thousand cuts. The need for many bandages,
however, makes a poor justification for applying none.
I.

WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT RISK

Litigation can take multiple paths that could end in a law firm going
uncompensated (or undercompensated) for the services it has provided to a client.
This Part analyzes some of those paths and clarifies which of them are included in
this Article’s discussion of compensation for risk. As explained below, some of the
risks a firm assumes in statutory fee-shifting cases do not plausibly warrant

39. See infra Section III.E.
40. See infra Part IV.
41. Case-specific multipliers could be implemented in such a way as to mitigate, though
not eliminate, these types of concerns. See infra Section IV.B.
42. A uniform multiplier would nonetheless draw on the lessons of the contexts examined
here, particularly with regard to the amount of time and effort needed to evaluate a plaintiff’s
likelihood of success. See infra Section IV.C.
43. See infra Section I.A.
44. See Davies, supra note 21, at 263–64 (discussing the extent and impact of prohibitions
on the reimbursement of expert witness fees).
45. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103. 115–16 (1992); see also Thomas A. Eaton & Michael
L. Wells, Attorney’s Fees, Nominal Damages, and Section 1983 Litigation, 24 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 829. 844–46 (2016) (discussing lower-court interpretations of Farrar).
46. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
47. It could also reach back decades. In 1985, for example, several members of a task
force “expressed the view that fee awards in recent years in the social action context have been
so discouraging that few attorneys will accept a civil rights case.” Third Circuit Task Force on
Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 249 (1986).
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independent compensation, and others seem all but impossible to compensate
adequately. It is the remaining category of contingent risk on which this Article
focuses.
In addressing the role of risk in rate-setting and case-selection decisions, the
following discussion does not assume that a law firm will charge its clients a lineitem cost for risk-bearing services. Rather, it assumes that a for-profit firm will
generally charge the highest rates (on an hourly, percentage, or other basis) that the
market will bear and the law will allow. In addition to determining that rate, however,
a law firm must determine whether the rate will yield an adequate return on its
investment if it takes on a particular case. The risk of nonpayment (or underpayment)
factors into that analysis.48
A. Risks Specific to Fee Shifting
Some potential causes of nonpayment are specific to statutory fee-shifting cases,
such that one would not expect a law firm’s standard hourly rates (i.e., those charged
to paying clients) to reflect them. The Supreme Court has often failed to recognize
the existence of this category of risk, instead equating a law firm’s risk of
nonpayment with the strength of the plaintiff’s claim. For example, the Court wrote
in 1987 that “the risk of not being paid” in a statutory fee-shifting case “is measured
by the risk of losing rather than winning.”49
Contrary to the Court’s assertion, some risks of nonpayment may be inversely
proportional to the strength of the plaintiff’s claim.50 For example, a defendant facing
a strong claim might offer to provide all of the requested relief, but only in exchange
for the plaintiff’s agreement to waive her entitlement to fees. If the plaintiff accepts
this type of “sacrifice offer”51 (or, in a class action, if class counsel accepts it on the
plaintiffs’ behalf), the court must usually enforce the resulting agreement, including
the fee waiver.52

48. This discussion focuses on for-profit representation, but even in the context of
nonprofit and pro bono work, risk plays a role in case selection by affecting the firm’s analysis
of whether a matter’s expected benefits are worth its expected costs.
49. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 715–16
(1987); see also City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562 (1992) (asserting that “the
attorney’s contingent risk” is “the product of two factors: (1) the legal and factual merits of
the claim, and (2) the difficulty of establishing those merits”). But see Blum v. Stenson, 465
U.S. 886, 901 n.17 (1984) (referring to “the risk of not being the prevailing party . . . and
therefore not being entitled to an award of attorney’s fees from one’s adversary”).
50. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Mandatory Pro Bono and Private Attorneys General, 101
NW. U. L. REV. 1459, 1462 (2007) (explaining how fee-shifting rules can “deprive[] plaintiffs’
counsel of fees if she wins too easily”).
51. See David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive PublicInterest Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV. 209, 241 (2003).
52. See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 731–32 (1986); see also Reingold, supra note 24,
at 18–21 (describing the impact of Evans v. Jeff D. on private attorneys’ willingness to accept
fee-shifting cases). In cases seeking a large amount of monetary damages, a law firm can hedge
against this result through a retainer agreement that specifies a contingent percentage fee as
an alternative form of compensation. See infra Section II.A.2 (discussing such fee
arrangements). Otherwise, if the case is not a class action, a law firm might attempt to obtain
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Alternatively, in a case seeking only injunctive relief, a defendant who sees the
writing on the wall might unilaterally cease to engage in the challenged conduct
before a court can order it to do so. If the defendant engages in this type of “strategic
capitulation,”53 the court must usually dismiss the case as moot,54 and the plaintiff
will not qualify as a “prevailing party.”55 In either of these scenarios, the court must
usually deny any request for a statutory fee-shifting award.56
It is difficult to see how courts could realistically award sufficient compensation
to account for the possibility of a sacrifice offer or strategic capitulation. To see why,
imagine that your firm has been approached about representing a plaintiff in a
statutory fee-shifting case. Imagine further that if the court does award fees, the
amount will be $X + $Y, where $X is the amount you would demand for any other
type of case taken on contingency and $Y is the additional amount you would

some protection by seeking the client’s agreement not to waive fees. See Scott L. Cummings
& Ann Southworth, Between Profit and Principle: The Private Public Interest Firm, in
PRIVATE LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 183, 190–91 (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather
eds., 2009). Some bar associations, however, deem such agreements to be unethical. See, e.g.,
D.C. BAR, ETHICS OPINION 289 (1999), https://www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legalethics/opinions/opinion289.cfm [https://perma.cc/EAE7-465L] (“A client’s right to accept or
reject a settlement offer cannot be contracted away in advance through a provision in a retainer
agreement that precludes the client from accepting any settlement that waives the client’s right
to recover attorneys’ fees . . . .”). Even if deemed ethical, such agreements might “at best give
the lawyer a contractual right against his client.” N.Y. BAR ASS’N, COMMITTEE ON
PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, FORMAL OPINION 1987-4 (1987), https://www.nycbar
.org/member-and-career-services/committees/reports-listing/reports/detail/formal-opinion-19
87-4 [https://perma.cc/Y5HM-K8DP].
53. Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights:
The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1087, 1091 (2007).
54. Under some circumstances, an exception to mootness may apply. For example, a
defendant’s voluntary cessation of challenged conduct does not moot a case unless
“subsequent events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not
reasonably be expected to recur.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Exp. Ass’n,
393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). But see Michael Ashton, Note, Recovering Attorneys’ Fees with
the Voluntary Cessation Exception to Mootness Doctrine After Buckhannon Board and Care
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 2002 W IS. L. REV.
965, 969 (examining the barriers to applying this exception to government defendants).
55. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human Res.,
532 U.S. 598, 605 (2001); see also Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 53, 1092, 1101–02
(describing the impact of Buckhannon on public interest litigation); Karlan, supra note 1, at
205–08 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Buckhannon).
56. Some caveats apply. Because the Buckhannon restriction is based on the meaning of
the term “prevailing party,” it does not apply to statutes that use different standards for fee
eligibility. See, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 244 (2010)
(discussing a statute making fee awards available “to either party” at the court’s “discretion”);
Loggerhead Turtle v. Cty. Council of Volusia Cty., 307 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(A)(5)) (discussing a statute making fee awards available “to
any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate”). Moreover, even if a
court would deny a request for a statutory fee-shifting award, the parties could agree to the
payment of attorney’s fees as part of their settlement.
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demand because of risks specific to statutory fee shifting.57 Even if you achieve an
overwhelmingly successful result after years of hard-fought litigation,58 there is a
real chance that your firm will receive no compensation at all for its work on the
case. With that in mind, how high would $Y have to be in order for your firm to
accept the representation?
For purposes of this Article, I assume that such an amount would be higher than
a court would be willing to award and that this obstacle to representation should
instead be addressed through changes to the fee-eligibility standard.59 Accordingly,
except where specifically noted, the discussion that follows will not address
compensation for the risks of nonpayment that are specific to the representation of
plaintiffs in statutory fee-shifting cases.60
B. More General Types of Risk
Like other service providers, when a law firm provides services in anticipation of
payment, it generally faces the risk that the client (or other obligor) will not pay the
bill. Presumably, law firms set their hourly rates with this possibility in mind.
Accordingly, even if a firm charges its clients through standard (i.e., noncontingent)
hourly billing, one would expect its standard rates to reflect this particular risk.61
Because a firm’s standard hourly rates are already a component of the lodestar, there
does not seem to be a viable argument for adjusting fee awards upward to account
for this particular type of risk,62 and the remainder of this Article should be read to
exclude it.
Another category of risk, which does not apply to standard hourly billing, affects
only those law firms whose compensation depends on their client’s success in
obtaining relief. It arises from the possibility that the plaintiff will lose the case, in
part or in full, such that the law firm will not be compensated for the labor and other

57. This hypothetical is meant as a thought experiment, rather than a suggestion that firms
in fact set their rates in this manner. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
58. The settlement that waived entitlement to fees in Evans v. Jeff D., for example, was
offered after the litigation had been pending for more than two and a half years. See Evans v.
Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 721–22 (1986) (noting that the complaint was filed in August 1980 and
the settlement offer was made in March 1983).
59. For arguments in support of such changes, see Albiston & Nielsen, supra note 53;
Reingold, supra note 24.
60. At the same time, the analysis will reflect the current prevailing-party standard,
especially with regard to its effects on a defendant’s ability to avoid fee liability.
61. See Jones v. Cent. Soya Co., 748 F.2d 586, 593 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he risk of
nonpayment by a client liable for fees . . . is assumed without special compensation by all
attorneys in all cases.”). Some law firms, however, require some amount of prepayment as a
means of mitigating this risk. See, e.g., Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding Retainers and
Flat Fees, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 113, 116–18 (2009) (discussing the “security retainer,” which
“is intended to secure the client’s payment of fees for future services that the lawyer is
expected to perform”).
62. An exception might be if a law firm usually required payment in advance, such as
through the use of a security retainer. See Richmond, supra note 61, at 116–18. In those
circumstances, the firm’s standard hourly rates might not reflect this particular risk of
nonpayment.
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resources it has invested in the litigation. It is this contingent risk on which this
Article will focus.
Because the purpose of fee-shifting statutes is to enable plaintiffs with meritorious
claims to find representation, this category of contingent risk is properly viewed from
the standpoint of a law firm deciding whether to represent a claimant.63 It turns
largely on the information then available to the law firm about the merits of the
claims—what the courts will likely say about the applicable law, what evidence will
likely come out in discovery, how the fact finder will likely interpret that evidence,
and so on.64
“Risk,” however, is not synonymous with “merit.”65 If a meritorious claim is one
on which the plaintiff prevails, then any claim with a nonzero chance of success
might turn out to be meritorious.66 When a defendant settles for more than nuisance
value, it implicitly acknowledges that the plaintiff had some nonzero chance of
success,67 and when a court calculates a fee-shifting award, it has already established
that the plaintiff is a “prevailing party” who has obtained court-ordered relief.68 In
those contexts, to say that a claim initially appeared “risky” means only that the
plaintiff initially faced obstacles to the success (whether through settlement or
adjudication) that she ultimately achieved.
Indeed, although one scholar has argued that there is no apparent justification for
subsidizing “risky” cases,69 the world of litigation does not divide itself into “risky”
and “risk-free” claims. The latter category does not exist, because all claims—even
those that initially seem overwhelmingly likely to succeed—involve some amount

63. Cf. Osbeck, supra note 19, at 48 (“[O]utcome prediction is an important part of the
initial case assessment that takes place before an action is originated.”).
64. It can also depend on factors connected to the identity of the adversary—whether this
defendant has shown a willingness to engage in scorched-earth litigation tactics, for example,
or an unwillingness to settle at any cost.
65. This recognition of the difference between “risk” and “merit” is itself distinct from
the recognition that “meritless” does not mean “valueless.” See Alexander A. Reinert,
Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191, 1197 (2014)
(examining “the many ways in which nonmeritorious, but nonfrivolous cases can contribute
to the law”).
66. Id. (“If we cannot determine at filing that a case has a zero chance of success, then the
case may be meritless or meritorious . . . .”).
67. Cf. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (discussing the impact of
judges’ “rulings in adjudicated cases and their anticipated response to the case at hand” on
“the respective bargaining endowments that parties bring to their settlement negotiations”).
68. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep’t of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001); see also supra Section I.A.
69. See Hylton, supra note 28, at 1115. But see Charles Silver, Unloading the Lodestar:
Toward A New Fee Award Procedure, 70 TEX. L. REV. 865, 896–97 (1992) (arguing that “the
assumption that fee-shifting cases yield substantial external benefits supports the claim that
higher levels of risk-taking are more appropriate in such cases than in cases subject to the
American Rule”).
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of risk.70 Because of this ubiquitous uncertainty, a “risky” case is just a case, not
necessarily a long shot.71
Finally, although one might assume that successful but initially higher risk cases
will generate a higher lodestar value,72 the structure of our procedural system and the
role of happenstance thoroughly disrupt that relationship. As to procedure, under our
system of notice pleading and liberal discovery, the cost of discovery
overwhelmingly drives the cost of litigation.73 Because of discovery’s
expansiveness, a claim that turns on a pure question of law will usually require fewer
attorney hours than a claim that turns on a pure question of fact, even if the question
of law requires overturning precedent and the question of fact has an overwhelmingly
likely answer.74
As to happenstance, a law firm deciding whether to take on a client cannot know
whether a pending cert petition will result in an unfavorable change in the law,
whether the claimant’s key witnesses will become unavailable before their deposition
or trial (e.g., because they are sick or elderly), or whether an unsympathetic trial
judge or appellate panel will be randomly assigned to the case.75 Those types of
possibilities have a significant impact on the claimant’s initial likelihood of

70. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 563 (1992) (“[N]o claim has a 100%
chance of success . . . .”). The Supreme Court once put the point as follows:
[S]eldom can a prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success. No matter how
honest one’s belief that he has been the victim of discrimination, no matter how
meritorious one’s claim may appear at the outset, the course of litigation is rarely
predictable. Decisive facts may not emerge until discovery or trial. The law may
change or clarify in the midst of litigation.
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 422 (1978).
71. To the extent that one might question the extent to which fee awards should be
enhanced “in cases in which the probability of a plaintiff victory is low,” Hylton, supra note
28, at 1115, that question goes to how rather than whether risk-bearing services should be
compensated. In particular, it raises the possibility that some lower-probability claims should
result in no more compensation than higher-probability claims. See infra Sections IV.B–C.
72. See infra notes 141–143 and accompanying text.
73. See Paul Stancil, Balancing the Pleading Equation, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 90, 100
(2009) (citing Memorandum from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules,
to Hon. Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999),
192 F.R.D. 340, 357); see also Robin J. Effron, Putting the “Notice” Back into Pleading, 41
CARDOZO L. REV. 981, 1007 (2020) (explaining that notice pleading “shift[ed] the
meritoriousness problem away from pleading and into discovery and later stages of
litigation”).
74. Even difficult legal research generally takes less time than preparing for and
conducting depositions of fact witnesses, preparing for and conducting depositions of expert
witnesses, drafting and responding to interrogatories and requests for admission, putting
together motions for summary judgment, and the like.
75. Cf. Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 554 (2010) (arguing that an unexpectedly
favorable outcome “may result from inferior performance by defense counsel, unanticipated
defense concessions, unexpectedly favorable rulings by the court, an unexpectedly
sympathetic jury, or simple luck”).
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success,76 but the claimants’ attorneys can do little or nothing to avoid them,77 so
they will have little to no impact on the lodestar amount.
II. COMPENSATION FOR RISK UNDER FEDERAL FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES
This Part examines the difficulties that courts have faced in determining
appropriate compensation for risk under federal fee-shifting statutes. As explained
below, federal courts provided such compensation for several years, but the Supreme
Court’s 1992 decision in City of Burlington v. Dague put a stop to the practice.78 That
decision has undermined the ability of civil rights claimants to obtain effective
representation.
A. The Underlying Dilemma
Questions about the calculation of statutory fee-shifting awards require courts to
determine “what Congress meant by a ‘reasonable’ fee.”79 Accordingly, it is worth
examining why Congress has enacted fee-shifting statutes, how claimants and their
counsel have used them, and how courts have understood their goals.
1. Market Gaps
To understand the purposes of fee-shifting statutes, consider what a world without
them would look like. In this hypothetical world, so long as contingent percentage
fees remain available, some claimants will be able to rely on contingency agreements
to find representation. For example, a stockbroker who makes a six-figure salary will
probably be able to find effective representation for her sexual harassment claim,
because the amount of lost wages at stake will be quite substantial.80 For a worker

76. For example, different judges will make different decisions based on identical
evidence, case law, and arguments, both at the trial and appellate levels. See Marin K. Levy,
Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 65, 115 (2017)
(“Any litigant will tell you that the composition of a panel matters for the outcome of an
appeal. And any scholar of judicial decision making will tell them that they are right.”).
Moreover, as the abuse of discretion standard recognizes, some trial-court decisions can
legitimately go either way.
77. For example, an attorney might draw on her skill and experience when choosing
where to file a complaint (if the constraints of jurisdiction and venue allow for such a choice),
but the assignment of a particular district judge will usually be made at random. See Daniel
Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 254 (2016) (“The norm in
federal district courts is random assignment among judges within a district.”). Similarly,
appellate panels are configured semirandomly. See generally Levy, supra note 76.
78. 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
79. Perdue, 559 U.S. at 550 (noting that fee-shifting statutes “do[] not explain what
Congress meant by a ‘reasonable’ fee, and therefore the task of identifying an appropriate
methodology for determining a ‘reasonable’ fee was left for the courts”).
80. Cf. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 492
(7th Cir. 2012) (“The stakes in each of the plaintiffs’ claims are great enough to make
individual suits feasible. Most of Merrill Lynch’s brokers earn at least $100,000 a year, and
many earn much more, and the individual claims involve multiple years.”).
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making the federal minimum wage, however, the situation will be very different. A
full year of lost wages for that worker will amount to about $14,500, and a typical
contingency fee on that amount will be between $4800 and $5800.81 Considering that
an employment-discrimination case can last for years, require thousands of dollars
in direct costs, and demand hundreds of hours of attorney labor, the worker will
probably not be able to find effective representation on the basis of that potential
contingency fee.82
Other claimants who seek representation will be interested only in pursuing
injunctive relief,83 or will face statutorily, constitutionally, or judicially imposed
limitations on the monetary relief available to them. The Americans with Disabilities
Act’s public accommodations title, for example, does not allow private plaintiffs to
recover damages.84 Under the Eleventh Amendment, “[s]tates and state officers
acting in their official capacity are immune from suits for damages in federal
court,”85 with only limited exceptions. With regard to constitutional violations,
qualified immunity prevents the recovery of damages from “all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”86 When an injunction or award
of nominal damages is the only relief pursued or the only relief available, the
contingent percentage fee will not provide a financial incentive for a law firm to take
on the representation.87
Instead of relying on the contingent percentage fee, some claimants will have the
wherewithal to pay out of pocket during the pendency of the litigation. Even such a
claimant, however, generally “will prefer to bring suit only if the expected award
exceeds his payment to the attorney.”88 Moreover, “[a] rational, profit-maximizing
attorney will prosecute a plaintiff’s claim if and only if the expected payment from

81. The $14,500 figure is based on 40 hours per week for 50 paid work weeks at the
federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. The $4800 and $5800 figures are based on a 33%
and 40% contingent percentage fee, respectively.
82. The difficulty of finding representation for sexual harassment plaintiffs working lowwage jobs—even in a world with fee-shifting statutes, rather than the hypothetical world
discussed in the text—motivated the founding of the Time’s Up Legal Defense Fund. See
Frequently Asked Questions about the Time’s Up Legal Defense Fund and the Legal Network
for Gender Equity, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CENT., https://nwlc.org/times-up-legal-defensefund/frequently-asked-questions-about-the-times-up-legal-defense-fund-and-the-legalnetwork-for-gender-equity [https://perma.cc/36QK-H5KW] (“[I]t can be difficult to find a
lawyer to take on these types of cases, particularly for those working in low-wage jobs. This
Fund will help encourage more lawyers to take on these cases.”).
83. For a discussion of claimants who seek only injunctive relief, see supra notes 26–27
and accompanying text.
84. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Perversity of Limited Civil Rights Remedies: The Case
of “Abusive” ADA Litigation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2006).
85. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 609 n.10 (2001).
86. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 335 (1986).
87. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Socializing Law, Privatizing Law, Monopolizing Law,
Accessing Law, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 691, 709 (2006) (noting that the contingent-fee market
“eliminates cases seeking an injunction or similar order” because “[i]f no money changes
hands, nothing drives the market”).
88. Hylton, supra note 28, at 1114.
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the client exceeds the cost of prosecuting the claim.”89 Those conditions mean that
economically rational clients will not generally pursue civil rights claims for
injunctive relief or nominal damages,90 even if no other type of relief is available.
Such claims thus fall into gaps in the market for legal services.91
Congress could have addressed these market gaps in a number of different ways,92
but it chose—repeatedly, and at very different points in time—to enact fee-shifting
statutes.93 Its reasoning often sounded in concerns about government resources and
policy drift. In support of the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976,94 for
example, “a broad and bipartisan coalition of legislators pointed to the success of fee
shifting in mobilizing robust private enforcement in the recent civil rights laws; to
the insufficiency of executive enforcement; and to the ability of fee-shifting rules to
provide needed enforcement without increasing bureaucracy or budgets.”95
2. Fee Arrangements
Although courts often refer to the amount to be paid to the attorneys, fee-shifting
statutes actually vest fee eligibility in the prevailing plaintiff herself.96 A law firm

89. Id.
90. Under some circumstances, even an economically rational claimant might seek only
injunctive relief or nominal damages. For example, she might expect that the defendant will
prefer to enter into a monetary settlement rather than face entry or enforcement of the judgment
she seeks. Alternatively, the injunctive relief might give her a competitive advantage or
otherwise have significant financial value to her.
91. One scholar has argued that compensation for risk “should never be necessary because
claims that are not profitable ex ante will not be brought.” Hylton, supra note 28, at 1114. As
explained in the text, however, that is precisely the market gap that fee-shifting statutes were
meant to address. Cf. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 564 (1992) (“[F]or a very
large proportion of contingency-fee cases—those seeking not monetary damages but
injunctive or other equitable relief—there is no ‘market treatment.’ Such cases scarcely exist,
except to the extent Congress has created an artificial ‘market’ for them by fee shifting . . . .”).
92. Whether those alternatives would be better than fee-shifting (for some value of
“better”) is beyond the scope of this Article. Because fee-shifting is the mechanism we have,
it is the mechanism on which I will focus.
93. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 576 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(“Congress enacted § 1988 specifically because it found that the private market for legal
services failed to provide many victims of civil rights violations with effective access to the
judicial process.”).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012).
95. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS
IN THE U.S. 132 (2010); see also Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation:
Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384,
1387 (2000) (discussing the benefits of private enforcement as compared to enforcement by
agencies).
96. See Silver, supra note 69, at 877; see also Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 730 (1986)
(“Congress bestowed on the ‘prevailing party’ (generally plaintiffs) a statutory eligibility for
a discretionary award of attorney’s fees in specified civil rights actions.”) (emphasis in
original).
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can enter into a variety of arrangements with a client who holds this potential
entitlement to fees. Three such arrangements are especially relevant here.97
First, and most commonly, the client might convey the fee entitlement to the law
firm in exchange for representation.98 Under this arrangement, any payment the firm
receives for representing the client will come directly from the defendant.99 The firm
will not be compensated for the representation unless the court deems the plaintiff to
be a “prevailing party” or the defendant agrees to pay her attorney’s fees. The law
firm thus provides the client with risk-bearing services in addition to its attorneys’
labor.100
Second, if a claim involves the possibility of substantial monetary damages, the
client and the law firm might contract for a fee of either a percentage of the monetary
recovery or the full fee-shifting award, whichever is greater.101 If the plaintiff wins
and obtains a large enough monetary recovery, the firm will receive a percentage of
that recovery;102 if the plaintiff achieves “prevailing party” status but obtains a
smaller monetary recovery, the firm will receive the fee-shifting award;103 and if the
plaintiff loses, the firm will receive no compensation for the representation.
Accordingly, as in the first fee arrangement, the law firm provides the plaintiff with
both labor and risk-bearing services.
Third, a sufficiently well-off client might pay entirely out of pocket, at the law
firm’s usual rates, on an ongoing basis. Under this arrangement, any fee-shifting
award would have the effect of reimbursing the client (in whole or in part) for
attorney’s fees already paid.104 Unlike in the first two arrangements, the law firm
does not take on the risk of loss, as it will receive the same compensation regardless

97. To be clear, the discussion here does not attempt to cover all of the potential variations
on such agreements. Instead, it focuses on three illustrative categories.
98. Silver, supra note 69, at 877.
99. This scenario represents a straightforward example of a fee-shifting statute filling a
market gap, as it does not depend on either the possibility of substantial monetary relief or the
client’s ability to pay.
100. See supra notes 31–35 and accompanying text.
101. For an example of this type of agreement, see McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d
1383, 1393 (7th Cir. 1984). Under this arrangement, the fee-shifting statute might or might
not be filling a market gap, depending on how the law firm expected the percentage fee to
come into play. For example, the firm might have been using the percentage fee only as a
hedge against a potential sacrifice offer. (For a discussion of sacrifice offers, see supra Section
I.A.)
102. For example, say the percentage set forth in the retainer agreement is 40%, the
plaintiff is awarded $500,000 in damages, and the court orders a fee shift of $100,000. In that
scenario, the law firm will receive $200,000 (which is 40% of $500,000), and the plaintiff will
take home $400,000 (which is the sum of the $500,000 damages award and the $100,000 feeshifting award, minus the $200,000 counsel fee).
103. For example, say the percentage set forth in the retainer agreement is 40%, the
plaintiff is awarded $200,000 in damages, and the court orders a fee shift of $100,000. In that
scenario, the law firm will receive $100,000 (which is the amount of the fee-shifting award),
and the plaintiff will take home $200,000 (which is the amount of the damages award).
104. Under this scenario, the fee-shifting statute is probably not filling a market gap, unless
the claimant would not have filed the case without the possibility of reimbursement.
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of the outcome.105 Accordingly, this third type of arrangement does not involve the
provision of risk-bearing services, and this Article’s discussion of compensation for
risk should generally be read to exclude it.
The possibility of a noncontingent fee arrangement raises a question about the
fairness (to the defendant) of including compensation for risk in fee-shifting awards:
Why should the plaintiff’s choice of fee arrangement obligate the defendant to pay a
greater amount in attorney’s fees?106 That question can be answered by reference to
the purpose of fee-shifting statutes—to encourage private enforcement of the
specified laws107—and the inability of many (if not most) claimants to pay out of
pocket for legal services. An extensive body of research has shown that low- and
middle-income claimants face tremendous difficulties in finding representation.108
An indigent client does not truly choose a contingent fee arrangement; rather, unless
a law firm agrees to represent her for free,109 it is simply the only option available to
her. Because of the high and often unpredictable cost of legal services, the same is
true of many middle-income clients.110
If fee-shifting doctrine deems plaintiffs responsible for funding their own cases
up front, then fee-shifting awards will enable litigation only in those cases that
plaintiffs could already afford to fund up front—or that law firms are willing to work
on for free.111 Fee-shifting statutes do not aim so low. A “reasonable” statutory feeshifting award is not one that merely helps to defray a successful plaintiff’s out-ofpocket litigation expenses, but one “that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to
undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case.” 112

105. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 716
(1987) (plurality opinion) (“[W]hen the plaintiff has agreed to pay its attorney, win or lose,
the attorney has not assumed the risk of nonpayment and there is no occasion to adjust the
lodestar fee because the case was a risky one.”). In effect, the client has borne the risk herself.
One might argue that she should receive a risk premium for doing so, but that argument would
run up against the Supreme Court’s conclusion that “Congress [likely] contemplated an
attorney-client relationship as the predicate for an award under § 1988.” Kay v. Ehrler, 499
U.S. 432, 436 (1991).
106. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 675 (1982) (discussing this argument).
107. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (stating that
Congress enacted the fee-shifting statute at issue “to encourage individuals injured by racial
discrimination to seek judicial relief”); see also supra Section II.A.1.
108. “According to most estimates, about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor,
and two- to three-fifths of the needs of middle-income individuals, remain unmet.” D EBORAH
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 14 (2004); see also LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP:
MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 6 (2017) (finding
that “71% of low-income households experienced at least one civil legal problem” in the prior
year but “86% of [those] civil legal problems . . . received inadequate or no legal help”).
109. For a discussion of the limited availability of pro bono representation, see infra
Section II.D.
110. See RHODE, supra note 108, at 14.
111. See Karlan, supra note 1, at 205–06 (“[M]ost civil rights plaintiffs are unable to afford
counsel, and without a fees statute, the available counsel would be limited to attorneys willing
to represent them pro bono.”).
112. Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010).
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3. Market Rates
As legislative history makes clear, Congress intended for statutes like 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988113 to “enabl[e] vigorous enforcement of modern civil rights legislation,”
which “reflects a heavy reliance on attorneys’ fees” in order to secure compliance.114
In recognition of the litigation-enabling purpose of fee-shifting statutes, the Supreme
Court has long held that fee awards should be based on “market rates for the services
rendered.”115 If a law firm knows that a fee-shifting award will compensate it at
market rates for the services it provides, a plaintiff should be able to trade her fee
entitlement for effective representation.
With regard to risk-bearing services, the difficulty lies in figuring out how to
provide market-rate compensation in situations where the contingent-fee market falls
short.116 If the awards are too low, claimants will not be able to use the prospect of a
fee-shifting award to attract effective counsel, violators will evade responsibility for
fully compensatory fees, and some meritorious claims will never be filed. The claims
that do attract qualified counsel will skew away from those seeking injunctive or
declaratory relief and toward those seeking large amounts of damages.117 If the
awards are too high, plaintiffs or their counsel will receive a windfall at the
defendant’s expense, and the filing of high-risk claims may be unduly encouraged.118
The underlying questions are both market-based and inescapably normative. How
much risk is it reasonable for a profit-motivated law firm to take on—and for a losing
defendant to have to pay for? Which valid claims should, under a proper
interpretation of fee-shifting statutes, be supported by a financial incentive to
litigate—and which should be left without that incentive, because it would lead to
the filing of too many claims that would ultimately fail, or because it would impose
unacceptable costs on defendants? As discussed below, courts have long struggled
to find the appropriate balance among these competing concerns.
B. Early Federal Cases
When the Third Circuit first introduced the lodestar method in 1973, it identified
the “contingent nature of success” as a “factor[] that must be taken into account in

113. Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012).
114. S. REP. No. 94-1011, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5911. Section
1988 also aimed to “deter[] frivolous suits by authorizing an award of attorneys’ fees against
a party shown to have litigated in ‘bad faith’ under the guise of attempting to enforce” the
provisions listed in a fee-shifting statute. Id. at 5.
115. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283 (1989).
116. For a discussion of such market gaps, see supra Section II.A.1.
117. See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing fee arrangements in which the law firm will
receive, at a minimum, a set percentage of any monetary recovery); see also Blanchard v.
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 95 (1989) (“The intention of Congress was to encourage successful
civil rights litigation, not to create a special incentive to prove damages and shortchange efforts
to seek effective injunctive or declaratory relief.”).
118. See Hylton, supra note 28, at 1115 (arguing that subsidization in the form of a casespecific risk multiplier could be expected to “lead to an increase in the number of risky claims
brought within the subsidized field of litigation”).
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computing the value of attorneys’ services.”119 Ten years later, when the Supreme
Court first held that courts should use the lodestar method as a starting point for
calculating fee-shifting awards,120 it likewise did not prohibit contingency
adjustments—though neither did it embrace them.121
By the mid-1980s, most of the federal appellate courts had allowed contingency
enhancements to the lodestar in statutory fee-shifting cases.122 The predominant
approach was to determine the value of the enhancement on an ex post, case-by-case
basis: After the plaintiff had achieved prevailing-party status, the court would look
backward at the level of risk that the case had presented at the time of its filing, and
would award higher levels of compensation for higher levels of risk. Some courts
increased the lodestar by an ad hoc percentage, such as 10% or 50%, while others
multiplied the lodestar by the inverse of the case’s initial likelihood of success.123
Although most scholars agreed that fee-shifting awards should include
compensation for risk, many criticized these case-specific approaches.124 First, some
doubted that a court could accurately determine, after a case had already been
resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, what the plaintiff’s probability of success had been
at the time the action was filed.125 Yet switching from an ex post to an ex ante
procedure would create its own set of problems. In particular, encouraging the
plaintiff’s attorneys to highlight the weaknesses of their client’s still-pending case
(in order to convince the court that it presented a relatively high amount of risk, and
thus that it warranted a relatively high-risk multiplier) could create serious conflicts
of interest.126

119. Lindy Bros. Builders of Phila. v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d
161, 168 (3d Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
120. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Before the Court’s decision in
Hensley, lower courts used a variety of methods for calculating fees. See Samuel R. Berger,
Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What Is “Reasonable”?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 281, 283–84
(1977) (“[T]here are nearly as many approaches . . . as there are judges.”).
121. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424; see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 901 n.17 (1984)
(“We have no occasion in this case to consider whether the risk of not being the prevailing
party in a § 1983 case, and therefore not being entitled to an award of attorney’s fees from
one’s adversary, may ever justify an upward fee adjustment.”).
122. See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 717
& n.4 (1987) (collecting cases). At that time, court-ordered compensation for risk already had
a long pedigree. See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet
Without the Prince of Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 83–84 (1989) (“In cases where the fee
is set by the court, as in class actions, stockholders’ derivative actions, and many suits under
federal statutes, courts for over fifty years have routinely taken the contingency factor into
account in setting fees.”).
123. For example, if the claim had a 50% chance of success at the time it was filed, the
court would apply a 2x risk multiplier to the lodestar amount.
124. See Rowe, supra note 28, at 632 (discussing the prevailing scholarly view); see, e.g.,
Leubsdorf, supra note 33.
125. See Leubsdorf, supra note 33, at 474; see also Rowe, supra note 28, at 632 (“It is hard
to say in hindsight how much of what turned out to be a silk purse really looked like a sow’s
ear at the start of litigation, and it is at best unseemly for the winners’ lawyer to argue that
their now successful claim originally appeared doomed to lose.”).
126. Leubsdorf, supra note 33, at 483.
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Second, some deemed it inappropriate to give plaintiffs’ counsel the same
incentive to accept a case with a lower likelihood of success as to accept a case with
a higher likelihood of success.127 Viewed on an ex ante basis from the plaintiff’s side,
applying case-specific multipliers in their exact-inverse form would entail that a feeshifting case with a 90% likelihood of success (and a correspondingly low multiplier)
would have the same expected value to the plaintiff’s counsel as a case with only a
10% chance of success (and a correspondingly high multiplier). Accordingly, a
perfectly risk-neutral law firm would have an equivalent interest in both.128 By
contrast, a risk-averse law firm would prefer the case with the greater likelihood of
success (and the correspondingly lower multiplier).
Finally, some deemed case-specific multipliers to be unjust to the defendant.
Viewed on an ex post basis from the defendant’s side, applying case-specific
multipliers in their exact-inverse form would entail that the cost of aggressively
defending a case with a 90% chance of success (and a correspondingly low
multiplier) would be less than the cost of aggressively defending a case with only a
10% chance of success (and a correspondingly high multiplier).129 Because the
former cost would come to fruition only if the plaintiff achieved “prevailing party”
status,130 however, the two cases would have the same expected value from an ex
ante perspective.131 Accordingly, a perfectly risk-neutral defendant would not fear
one more than the other.132 By contrast, a risk-averse defendant would be more

127. See id. at 474 (“The current theory of contingency bonuses implies that lawyers and
clients should be made as willing to bring a feeble suit as a promising one. This theory is as
defective as its results would be undesirable . . . .”).
128. See infra note 131. Of course, perfect risk neutrality rarely if ever occurs. For a
plaintiff-side law firm, risk neutrality is limited by factors including the characteristics of the
other cases in its portfolio, its overhead costs, and the liquid resources available to it.
Recognizing those limits, one third-party litigation funding (TPLF) provider has asserted in
its advertising to plaintiff-side law firms that “[f]irms that embrace contingent-fee
engagements can quickly surpass the financial risk they’re willing to bear.” B URFORD
CAPTIAL, FINANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF LAW: HOW BURFORD HELPS LAW FIRMS 4 (2018). For
further discussion of TPLF, see infra Section III.E.
129. Rowe, supra note 28, at 632 (“Large enhancements for low initial chances of winning
penalize most those defendants who had the strongest-seeming defenses and thus acted most
reasonably in resisting . . . .”).
130. Instead of aggressively defending a low-probability claim, and thereby risking a loss
on the merits, a defendant might choose to settle. Under those circumstances, one would expect
a rational defendant to discount its settlement offer (with respect to both merits and fee
liability) by its calculation of the plaintiff’s likelihood of success.
131. To see this, assume a lodestar value of L and a probability of success of S. For
simplicity, assume that the potential outcomes are limited to complete success and complete
failure. The exact-inverse, case specific multiplier would be 1/S, and the fee-shifting award
would be L * (1/S) = L/S. The defendant would pay the fee-shifting award only if the litigation
succeeded, so the expected value of the fee-shifting award would be S * L/S = L. Accordingly,
the expected value would directly vary with the lodestar value, but it would not directly vary
with the degree of risk presented by the case. (To the extent that the lodestar might be higher
for some successful but initially higher-risk cases, see supra Section I.B, that would be so
regardless of how the risk multiplier were set.)
132. Again, perfect risk neutrality rarely if ever occurs. For a defendant, risk neutrality is
limited by factors including its financial obligations, time-sensitive business opportunities,
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fearful of the case with the higher multiplier (and the correspondingly lower
likelihood of success).133
Due to the foregoing concerns about case-specific risk multipliers, some scholars
favored the use of a uniform multiplier (i.e., one that would not vary with the
characteristics of a particular case).134 The Supreme Court had an opportunity to
weigh in on the question in 1987, but the case did not result in a majority opinion.135
A four-Justice plurality would have held that risk enhancements should almost never
be permitted;136 a four-Justice dissent would have held that risk enhancements should
always be required;137 and a concurrence by Justice O’Connor stated that risk
enhancements should sometimes be permitted—but not on the basis of a case-bycase inquiry.138 In Justice O’Connor’s view, any risk multiplier should instead be
“based on the difference in market treatment of contingent fee cases as a class.”139
C. City of Burlington v. Dague
Five years later, in City of Burlington v. Dague, the question of compensation for
risk came back to the Supreme Court.140 This time, a six-Justice majority squarely
rejected risk enhancements, whether case-specific or otherwise. The Court began by
noting that a risk enhancement would “likely” result in double-counting of factors
already reflected in the lodestar amount.141 It reasoned that the unenhanced lodestar
reflects the difficulty of establishing the merits of a particular case, “either in the
higher number of hours expended to overcome the difficulty, or in the higher hourly
rate of the attorney skilled and experienced enough to do so.”142 Accordingly, in the

and the amount of liquid assets available to it.
133. It would be inappropriate to recognize this defense-side risk aversion without also
recognizing plaintiff-side risk aversion. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 17, at 310 (discussing the
“disingenuousness” of “tears for defendants settling to avoid bankruptcy but apparent
indifference to victims settling to avoid destitution”).
134. Leubsdorf, supra note 33, at 474–75.
135. See Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air (Delaware Valley
II), 483 U.S. 711, 728 (1987) (plurality opinion).
136. See id. at 728 (plurality opinion) (“[E]nhancement for the risk of nonpayment should
be reserved for exceptional cases where the need and justification for such enhancement are
readily apparent and are supported by evidence in the record and specific findings by the
courts.”).
137. See id. at 735 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 731 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
139. Id. (emphasis in the original).
140. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557 (1992). In the interim, the D.C. Circuit had
issued an opinion in which it pronounced itself “unable to derive a governing rule from the
opinion” in Delaware Valley II. King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The court
“urge[d] the Supreme Court to clarify its position” in light of the difficulties that multiple
circuits had experienced. Id.
141. Dague, 505 U.S. at 562.
142. Id. As discussed previously, contrary to the Court’s statement, lodestar values do not
vary in direct relation to litigation risk. See supra Section I.B.
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Court’s view, the product of hours times hourly rates already includes compensation
for contingent risk—despite being based on noncontingent rates.143
Next, the Court objected that risk multipliers would “provide attorneys with the
same incentive to bring relatively meritless claims as relatively meritorious ones”
and thus would “indiscriminately encourag[e] nonmeritorious claims to be
brought.”144 As noted above, this concern arises from the use of risk enhancements
determined on a case-by-case basis.145 Accordingly, it would not be implicated by a
standardized adjustment of the type Justice O’Connor had suggested a few years
earlier.146
The Court in Dague, however, also objected to the notion of a uniform risk
enhancement based on a plaintiff’s average likelihood of success. In the Court’s
view, because different cases involve different levels of risk, a uniform enhancement
would result in an over compensatory fee in any case with an above-average chance
of success.147 (In any case with a below-average chance of success, a uniform
enhancement would result in an undercompensatory fee, but—perhaps tellingly—
the Court omitted that side of the analysis.)
The Court further reasoned that contingency enhancements would be inconsistent
with the “prevailing party” limitation on statutory fee-shifting awards:
An attorney operating on a contingency-fee basis pools the risks
presented by his various cases: cases that turn out to be successful pay
for the time he gambled on those that did not. To award a contingency
enhancement under a fee-shifting statute would in effect pay for the
attorney’s time (or anticipated time) in cases where his client does not
prevail.148
The Court turned next to its prior decisions about the interaction between feeshifting awards and percentage-based retainer agreements. 149 Drawing on that case

143. The hourly-rate component of the lodestar may reflect the skill and experience of the
attorneys, but not the contingent risk presented by the case. See, e.g., Pickett v. Sheridan Health
Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632, 642 (7th Cir. 2011).
144. Dague, 505 U.S. at 563. This analysis rests on an insupportable view of the
relationship between litigation risk and merit. See supra Section I.B.
145. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. Moreover, even in the context of
case-specific risk enhancements, the multiplier value could be set in a manner that does not
equalize incentives in this manner. See infra Section IV.B.4.
146. An article cited in the Dague majority opinion made this very point. See Leubsdorf,
supra note 33, at 474; see also Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air,
483 U.S. 711, 731 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
147. Dague, 505 U.S. at 564–65. A uniform risk multiplier could be set in a manner that
would satisfy this concern about over-compensation. See infra Section IV.C.
148. Dague, 505 U.S. at 565. For responses to this concern about payment for work on
unsuccessful cases, see infra Sections III.A, III.B.
149. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82 (1990) (holding that a statutory fee-shifting
award did not eliminate a plaintiff’s obligation to ensure that his counsel received the full
percentage fee set forth in his retainer agreement); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989)
(holding that a percentage-based retainer agreement did not impose a ceiling on the plaintiff’s
statutory fee-shifting award).
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law, the Court asserted that it had “generally turned away from the contingent-fee
model . . . to the lodestar model.”150 It thus refused “to concoct a hybrid scheme”
with features of both.151 Because fee-shifting awards are contingent upon prevailingparty status, however, the contingency ingredient in that concoction cannot be
avoided.152
Finally, the Court expressed the view that risk enhancements “would make the
setting of fees more complex and arbitrary, hence more unpredictable, and hence
more litigable.”153 Although the Court did not identify these problems with
administrability as features of case-specific enhancements in particular, they are
largely inapplicable to a uniform risk enhancement, which would be predictable and
simple to administer.154
The Court in Dague did not question whether risk-bearing is too ancillary to
traditional legal services to warrant compensation under fee-shifting statutes. One
might have expected such an argument based on the Court’s decision the previous
year in West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,155 which held that the
statutory authorization of a “reasonable attorney’s fee” does not include expert
witness fees.156 The decision in Casey, however, relied on the dozens of federal feeshifting statutes that explicitly mentioned both attorney’s fees and expert witness
fees.157 The Court interpreted that statutory usage to mean that Congress treats
attorney’s fees and expert fees as “distinct items of expense,” such that expert fees
should not be shifted unless a statute specifically mentions them.158 Unlike expert
fees, federal fee-shifting statutes do not explicitly mention risk-bearing services as a
distinct item of expense. Accordingly, the decision in Casey does not require the
exclusion of compensation for risk.159

150. Dague, 505 U.S. at 565–66.
151. Id. at 566.
152. See Silver, supra note 28, at 333 n.112 (“[T]he court has not rejected the contingentfee model. To do that, it would have to order lower courts to grant fee awards even when
plaintiffs lose. Then, lodestar fees would not be contingent on success in litigation, as they
now are.”) (emphasis omitted).
153. Dague, 505 U.S. at 566. For a discussion of some state courts’ rejection of this
concern, see infra Section III.A.
154. See infra Section IV.C. Moreover, even in the context of case-specific risk
enhancements, the multiplier could be set in a manner that promotes administrability. See infra
Section IV.B.3.
155. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
156. Id. at 102. Congress partially abrogated this decision in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (2012).
157. Casey, 499 U.S. at 89.
158. Id. at 92.
159. The majority opinion in Dague does not cite or discuss Casey, an omission that
supports this conclusion. By contrast, Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Dague does include such
a citation:
[I]n some instances Congress explicitly has prohibited enhancements, as in the
1986 amendments to the Education of the Handicapped Act. See 20 U.S.C. §
1415(e)(4)(C) (“[n]o bonus or multiplier may be used in calculating the fees
awarded under this subsection”). Congress’ express prohibition on enhancement
in this statute suggests that it did not understand the standard fee-shifting
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Moreover, three years before its decision in Dague, the Court had rejected the
notion that a “reasonable attorney’s fee” should “compensate only work performed
personally by members of the bar.”160 Instead, the Court has determined that the
statutory language “must refer to a reasonable fee for the work product of an
attorney.”161 Such a fee “must take into account the work not only of attorneys, but
also of secretaries, messengers, librarians, janitors, and others whose labor
contributes to the work product for which an attorney bills her client; and it must also
take account of other expenses and profit.”162 This reasoning leaves little room for
the argument that litigation risk-bearing services are too ancillary to fall under the
umbrella of a “reasonable attorney’s fee,” especially as many law firms routinely
provide those risk-bearing services to their clients.163
D. The Status Quo
As a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dague, along with other
parsimonious interpretations of federal fee-shifting provisions,164 statutory feeshifting awards are structurally undercompensatory.165 The inability to offer a
competitive fee undermines fee-shifting claimants’ ability to secure representation,
just as the Eleventh Circuit anticipated (in a pre-Dague opinion) that it would:
Vindication of the policy of the law depends to a significant degree on
the willingness of highly skilled attorneys . . . to accept employment in
discrimination cases on a wholly contingent basis. They will hardly be
willing to do so if their potential compensation is limited to the hourly
rate to which they would be entitled in noncontingent employment.166
With regard to wholly profit-motivated counsel, this prediction has largely proven
true.167 Highly skilled attorneys do represent some plaintiffs in fee-shifting cases, but

language used elsewhere to bar enhancement. Cf. West Virginia Univ. Hospitals,
Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 92–97, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 1143–1146, 113 L.Ed.2d 68
(1991) (relying, in part, on express authorization of expert-witness fees in
subsequently passed fee-shifting statutes to infer that such fees could not have
been included in unsupplemented references to “attorney’s fees”).
Dague, 505 U.S. at 570 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations, quotation marks, and second
alteration in the original).
160. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283 (1989).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Cf. Morris A. Ratner, Class Counsel as Litigation Funders, 28 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
271, 293–95 (2015) (arguing that courts should treat “litigation funding and insurance against
the possibility of non-recovery” as “professional” services for purposes of ethical rules
governing profit-making).
164. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text; see generally Karlan, supra note 1.
165. See Bagenstos, supra note 84, at 10–11 (“[U]nder the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of the fee-shifting statutes, practitioners who rely on statutory attorneys’ fees will always earn
lower effective hourly rates than similarly credentialed practitioners with fee-paying clients.”).
166. Yates v. Mobile Cty. Pers. Bd., 719 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1983).
167. See, e.g., Green, supra note 15, at 1330 (“[D]espite the fee shifting statutes that permit
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much of that representation occurs on a pro bono or nonprofit basis.168 Those types
of legal work, in turn, account for too small a segment of the legal market to make
up for a structurally inadequate fee-shifting regime. Private attorneys do very little
pro bono work: “a lawyer’s average pro bono contribution is estimated at less than
half a dollar a day and half an hour a week,”169 and “pro bono service occupies less
than one percent of lawyers’ working hours.”170 “[C]ivil legal aid programs now
reflect less than one percent of the nation’s legal expenditures,”171 and “[f]ewer than
one in ten lawyers accept referrals from legal aid programs or groups serving lowincome communities.”172 Public interest law organizations operate on a shoestring
budget, but they still must turn down promising fee-shifting cases because they
cannot afford to bring them.173
When profit-motivated representation occurs, it often results not from the
potential for a fee-shifting award, but from the expectation of a contingent percentage
fee.174 The functioning of the contingent percentage fee, however, depends on the
availability of a sufficient amount of monetary relief.175 Some profit-motivated firms
represent civil rights clients in relatively high-damages cases, and make a great deal
of money doing so, but the success of that business model has nothing to do with feeshifting statutes. Nor does that business model provide counsel for claimants who
seek only injunctive relief or relatively low amounts of damages.176

the prevailing party to collect attorneys’ fees from the employer, workers with small dollar
[wage theft] claims are rarely able to secure representation. Legal aid organizations and law
school clinics positioned to take cases without concern for the likelihood they will receive
attorneys’ fees are the exception to that rule.”); Reingold, supra note 24, at 41 (“[P]rivate
plaintiffs’ lawyers have stopped taking low-damages and injunctive-relief civil rights cases
because the lawyers have learned that they cannot make money on them.”).
168. I use “pro bono” here to mean representation provided without expectation of payment
or at a deep discount. I recognize that, although that usage is now common, it is also deeply
flawed. See Sabbeth, supra note 1, at 442–43; see also Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions
of Lawyers’ Pro Bono Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations,
77 TUL. L. REV. 91, 113 (2002).
169. Deborah L. Rhode, Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
869, 887 (2009).
170. Deborah L. Rhode, Equal Justice Under Law: Connecting Principle to Practice, 12
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 62 (2003).
171. Id.
172. See Rhode, supra note 169, at 887.
173. See, e.g., Margo Schlanger, The Just-Barely Sustainable California Prisoners’ Rights
Ecosystem, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 62, 75–76 (2016). For financial reasons, at least one
private public-interest law firm generally avoids fee-shifting cases in which the claimant seeks
only injunctive relief. See Scott L. Cummings, Privatizing Public Interest Law, 25 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1, 87–88 (2012).
174. See Reingold, supra note 24, at 19 n.57 (“Today the private bar views an ordinary tort
case and a civil rights case the same. Without good damages, the plaintiff will not be able to
find a private lawyer to represent him (other than very rare pro bono publico representation).”).
175. See supra Section II.A.1.
176. See Jonathan T. Molot, Fee Shifting and the Free Market, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1807,
1811 (2013) (“Indeed, only a fee-shifting regime can enable plaintiffs to bring meritorious,
low-value suits, which plaintiffs routinely must forego in a non-fee-shifting regime.”).
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The high rates of pro se representation in civil rights cases reflect the failure of
fee-shifting statutes to enable claimants to find counsel. Of the 36,984 nonprisoner
civil rights cases filed in 2015, more than a quarter (26%) involved a pro se plaintiff
suing a represented defendant.177 Moreover, research confirms the unremarkable
proposition that “[p]laintiffs who proceed on their own rarely do so with success.”178
To be sure, attorneys perform a gatekeeping function, and some claims that are
brought pro se would have failed under any circumstances. The federal courts’
inhospitability to pro se litigants,179 however, makes it hard to know how many of
those litigants might otherwise have prevailed.180 It is similarly difficult to know how
often claimants have been deterred from filing a lawsuit because they could not
secure representation. Accordingly, when it comes to civil rights claimants affected
by the parsimonious interpretation of federal fee-shifting statutes, the high rates of
pro se litigation might represent only the tip of the iceberg.181
The structurally undercompensatory nature of federal fee-shifting awards, and the
attendant suppression of civil rights claims, is probably not accidental. This status
quo might instead reflect judicial disapproval of the “private attorney general” model
of enforcement, hostility to the substantive laws supported by fee-shifting statutes,
or some combination of both.182 Nevertheless, I am unwilling to assume that
reasoned argument carries no force at all. Even if a judge might be inclined to accept
a somewhat weak argument that aligns with her priors, she might be disinclined to
accept a deeply flawed one. As this Article demonstrates, the arguments against
compensation for risk under federal fee-shifting statutes fit the latter description.

177. By contrast, less than 2% involved a represented plaintiff suing a pro se defendant,
and less than a tenth of a percent involved a pro se plaintiff suing a pro se defendant. These
numbers are based on data downloaded from the Federal Judicial Center’s Integrated
Database. Integrated Database (IDB), FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb
[https://perma.cc/Y9CB-L83K].
178. Daniels & Martin, Texas Plaintiffs’ Practice, supra note 32, at 287. For example,
among inmate civil rights cases terminated in 2000, “counseled cases were three times as likely
as pro se cases to have recorded settlements, two-thirds more likely to go to trial, and twoand-a-half times as likely to end in a plaintiff’s victory at trial.” Margo Schlanger, Inmate
Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1610 (2003).
179. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, REFORMING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: MY FORMER
COURT NEEDS TO OVERHAUL ITS STAFF ATTORNEY PROGRAM AND BEGIN TELEVISING ITS ORAL
ARGUMENTS 31 (2017) (describing the “downright indifference of most judges to the needs of
pro se’s” and noting that “judges often are distracted, preoccupied, or uninterested in pro se
cases”).
180. See Schlanger, supra note 178, at 1613–14 (“[W]ithout data, there is really no way to
know which effect dominates—the depression of success rates because lawyers are absent, or
the absence of lawyers because the cases are not very good cases. What is clear is that both
effects operate . . . .”).
181. Cf. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, and Claiming, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 636
(1981) (examining the mechanisms through which “only a small fraction of injurious
experiences ever mature into disputes”).
182. See Silver, supra note 28, at 304–05 (evaluating these possibilities).
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III. COMPENSATION FOR RISK IN OTHER CONTEXTS
Contingent risk is not limited to federal fee-shifting cases. To the contrary, law
firms and lenders routinely take on this type of risk,183 and courts and markets
routinely compensate them for it. The mechanisms through which that compensation
occurs include state fee-shifting statutes, contingent percentage fees, common-fund
awards, alternative fee arrangements, and third-party litigation funding. This Part
analyzes these mechanisms, each of which yields potentially useful information
about whether and how to incorporate compensation for risk into federal statutory
fee-shifting awards.
Because the Supreme Court in Dague expressed concern that compensation for
risk would “amount[] to double counting” (because such compensation is already
provided through the lodestar),184 would be judicially unworkable,185 would unduly
encourage non-meritorious litigation,186 and would improperly compensate counsel
for cases in which the plaintiff’s law firm did not prevail,187 this Part will pay
particular attention to those concerns. It will also attend to the question whether risk
multipliers should be uniform or case-specific, as that question generated significant
pre-Dague debate among courts and commentators.188
A. State Fee-Shifting Statutes
States have enacted a wide range of fee-shifting statutes that, like their federal
counterparts, aim to encourage litigation that serves the public interest. 189 After the
Supreme Court decided Dague, which addressed the question of compensation for
risk under federal fee-shifting statutes, the courts of several states revisited the
question of compensation for risk under these state fee-shifting statutes.190 Some of
those statutes are interpreted in lockstep with their federal counterparts, whether
because of a statutory provision to that effect,191 or because courts have required
consistency between state and federal fee-shifting standards.192 For the statutes

183. For a discussion of the type of risk I mean to include here, see supra Part I.
184. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1992).
185. Id. at 566.
186. Id. at 562–63.
187. Id. at 565.
188. See supra Section II.B.
189. Courts usually use the lodestar method when calculating state fee-shifting awards,
though at least one state has permitted use of the percentage method. See Griffith v. Clear
Lakes Trout Co., 200 P.3d 1162, 1172 (Idaho 2009).
190. Federal courts have addressed this question, but they have done so on a predictive
basis, as state courts have the ultimate say on questions of state law. See, e.g., Polselli v.
Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 126 F.3d 524, 535 (3d Cir. 1997) (“We predict that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would permit a trial court to enhance the lodestar amount to
account for a particular case’s contingent risk only to the extent that those factors creating the
risk are not already taken into account when calculating the lodestar amount.”).
191. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 760.11 (2015) (“It is the intent of the Legislature that this
provision for attorney’s fees be interpreted in a manner consistent with federal case law
involving a Title VII action.”).
192. See, e.g., Dutcher v. Randall Foods, 546 N.W.2d 889, 897–98 (Iowa 1996) (“[T]he
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interpreted in this manner, Dague directly resulted in the elimination (or prevention)
of contingency enhancements.193
More interesting are the state fee-shifting statutes that have required an
independent conclusion about compensation for risk.194 The courts of multiple states
have deemed such compensation to be permissible,195 and they have provided for
case-specific (rather than uniform) compensation for risk.196 For example, the New

method of calculating attorney fees should not vary between state and federal courts.
Therefore, we adopt the federal analytical framework for the calculation of attorney fees under
the Iowa Civil Rights Act.”).
193. See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Reddick, 954 So. 2d 723, 729 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2007) (reversing a trial court decision applying a risk multiplier because of the Supreme
Court’s intervening decision in Dague); Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., 840 S.W.2d 814,
826 (Ky. 1992) (noting that “the trial court was ahead of the United States Supreme Court”
when, shortly before Dague was decided, it held contingency enhancements to be
impermissible).
194. Some state statutes and procedural rules explicitly require courts to consider
contingent risk when setting fee amounts. See, e.g., IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54 (requiring courts to
consider “whether the fee is fixed or contingent” when determining the amount of attorney
fees); WIS. STAT. § 814.045(1)(k) (2011) (same); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-14-126 (2019) (same).
195. See Ketchum v. Moses, 17 P.3d 735, 744 (Cal. 2001) (“The experience of the
marketplace indicates that lawyers generally will not provide legal representation on a
contingent basis unless they receive a premium for taking that risk.” (quoting Berger, supra,
at 324–25)); Joyce v. Federated Nat’l Ins. Co., 228 So. 3d 1122, 1132 (Fla. 2017) (“[T]he
contingency fee multiplier provides trial courts with the flexibility to ensure that lawyers, who
take a difficult case on a contingency fee basis, are adequately compensated.”); Schefke v.
Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 32 P.3d 52, 94 (Haw. 2001) (permitting contingency
enhancements and concluding that Dague’s dissenting opinion is “better reasoned than
Dague’s majority opinion”); Berry v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., 397 S.W.3d 425 (Mo.
2013) (en banc); Atherton v. Gopin, 272 P.3d 700, 702 (N.M. 2012) (“‘An award based on a
lodestar may be increased by a multiplier if the lower court finds that a greater fee is more
reasonable after the court considers the risk factor and the results obtained.’”) (quoting In re
N.M. Indirect Purchasers Microsoft Corp., 149 P.3d 976, 992 (N.M. 2006)); Rendine v.
Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1228 (N.J. 1995); Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare,
LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 499 n.10 (Tex. 2019) (authorizing courts to consider “the attorney’s
risk in accepting [the] representation” when determining market rates for purposes of feeshifting awards); USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 372 P.3d 629, 665 (Utah 2016) (noting, in
a case brought pursuant to the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act, that “the lodestar method
permits a court to apply a ‘multiplier’ to increase or decrease the total award in order to account
for a number of factors, such as the contingent nature of the case, the risks assumed, and the
delay in payment.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Chuong Van Pham v. City
of Seattle, 151 P.3d 976, 983 (Wash. 2007) (interpreting Washington’s Law Against
Discrimination to “occasionally” permit contingency multipliers because “the WLAD places
a premium on encouraging private enforcement and . . . the possibility of a multiplier works
to encourage civil rights attorneys to accept difficult cases”); Pennaco Energy, Inc. v.
Sorenson, 371 P.3d 120 (Wyo. 2016) (applying a multiplier in a contractual fee-shifting case,
to which Wyoming courts apply the same standards as in a statutory fee-shifting case).
196. See, e.g., Silver Creek Invs., Inc. v. Whitten Const. Mgmt., Inc., 307 P.3d 360, 369
(Okla. Ct. App. 2013) (“The contingent nature of the attorney’s employment allows the district
court to adjust upward the basic hourly rate by allowing a risk-litigation premium based on
the likelihood of success at the outset of the representation.”) (citation and internal quotation
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Jersey Supreme Court wrote in 1995 that “a counsel fee awarded under a fee-shifting
statute cannot be ‘reasonable’ unless the lodestar, calculated as if the attorney’s
compensation were guaranteed irrespective of result, is adjusted to reflect the actual
risk that the attorney will not receive payment if the suit does not succeed.”197
Some of these state courts have expressly disagreed with some or all of the
reasoning in Dague. In 2001, for example, the Supreme Court of Hawai’i concluded
that “contingency enhancement would not result in compensation for cases lost by
plaintiff’s counsel, as posited by the Dague majority.”198 In support of that
conclusion, the court noted that risk enhancements would not vary with the amount
of time an attorney had spent on losing cases.199 To the contrary, “[a] lawyer who
loses ninety-nine cases before eking out a win receives the same percentage
enhancement in the successful case as a lawyer who wins one hundred times in
a row.”200
Similarly, when the Supreme Court of Florida reaffirmed the permissibility of
case-specific compensation for risk under a state fee-shifting statute in 2017,201 it
expressly rejected the concern expressed in Dague about administrability. The
Florida court “conclude[d] that there is no support in state courts, and indeed none
has been offered, that the availability of contingency fee multipliers ‘make the setting
of fees more complex and arbitrary.’”202 The court also disagreed with the concern
expressed in Dague that compensation for risk would unduly encourage the filing of
“nonmeritorious” claims, reasoning that “solely because a case is ‘difficult’ or
‘complicated’ does not mean that the case is nonmeritorious.”203
In sum, numerous courts have interpreted state fee-shifting statutes to allow casespecific compensation for risk. In doing so, some have explicitly rejected the
concerns expressed in Dague about payment for work on unsuccessful cases,
administrability, and the encouragement of non-meritorious litigation.
B. Contingent Percentage Fees
As compared to 1992, when the Supreme Court invoked the private-market
contingency fee as support for its prohibition on compensation for risk,204 a far richer
body of scholarship is now available about the mechanics of private contingency
practice.205 Herbert Kritzer’s study of Wisconsin contingent-fee lawyers in the mid-

marks omitted).
197. Rendine, 661 A.2d at 1228. Other courts have been less categorical. For example, the
Washington Supreme Court wrote that “[w]hile we presume that the lodestar represents a
reasonable fee [under the Washington Law Against Discrimination,] occasionally a risk
multiplier will be warranted because the lodestar figure does not adequately account for the
high risk nature of a case.” Chuong Van Pham, 151 P.3d at 983 (emphasis added).
198. Schefke, 32 P.3d at 97.
199. Id.
200. Id. (quoting Silver, supra note 28, at 332).
201. Joyce, 228 So. 3d at 1132.
202. Id. at 1133 (quoting Dague, 505 U.S. at 566).
203. Id. at 1132–33.
204. Dague, 505 U.S. at 565; see also supra Section II.C.
205. See supra note 32.
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1990s is particularly instructive.206 Contrary to the Court’s characterization of such
attorneys, Kritzer found that they behaved not like risk-loving gamblers,207 but like
risk-balancing investment managers.208
The attorneys Kritzer studied sought to put together a portfolio of cases with a
healthy balance of risks and rewards.209 In order to maintain that balance, the
attorneys agreed to represent only about half of the potential clients who contacted
them.210 The specific risks presented by each case weighed heavily in the attorneys’
case selection decisions. Those case-specific risks included “the uncertainty of
achieving any recovery, the size of that recovery, and the size of the investment
needed to obtain that recovery.”211
As the Wisconsin study demonstrated, unlike a client who enters into the typical
billable-hour arrangement, a client who enters into a contingent-fee agreement does
not simply purchase an attorney’s labor.212 Rather, the client also buys case-specific
financing and insurance by way of the law firm’s agreement not to require payment
until the case ends (the financing component) and to require only a payment
proportional to the success of the case (the insurance component).213 Like other
contracts involving financing and insurance, a contingent-fee agreement is informed
by the value of the risk-bearing services to be provided.214 Extracting a premium for
providing those risk-bearing services, as opposed to requiring payment only for the
attorneys’ labor, is precisely what an economist would expect a risk-bearer to do.215
Moreover, an economist would expect a law firm to charge that risk premium
even if it took only one case on contingency, just as she would expect a bank to
charge interest even if it made only one loan. It is thus peculiar to say, as the Supreme
Court did in Dague, that “[t]o award a contingency enhancement under a fee-shifting
statute would in effect pay for the attorney’s time (or anticipated time) in cases where
his client does not prevail.”216 To be sure, successful contingent-fee cases subsidize

206. See generally KRITZER, REPUTATIONS AND REWARDS, supra note 32 (discussing the
Wisconsin study); Kritzer, Wages of Risk, supra note 32 (same).
207. See Dague, 505 U.S. at 565.
208. See KRITZER, REPUTATIONS AND REWARDS, supra note 32, at 15–16.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 71.
211. Id. at 18; see also Daniels & Martin, Texas Plaintiffs’ Practice, supra note 32, at 300
(“Merely being successful in a case may not be enough. Anything affecting the cost of
handling cases or the time it takes to get an award may cause problems. A lawyer may still
face financial problems if the compensation is not sufficient to cover both the client’s needs
and the lawyer’s investment of time and money, or if the time it takes to get the award
increases.”).
212. Kritzer, Wages of Risk, supra note 32, at 270.
213. Id. at 270–71; see also supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
214. Kritzer, Wages of Risk, supra note 32, at 270.
215. Id. at 293. If the law firm cannot extract an adequate risk premium by charging a fee
that the market will bear and the law will allow, it will not take on the case. See Daniels &
Martin, Texas Plaintiffs’ Practice, supra note 32, at 287–88.
216. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. at 565; see also McKinnon v. City of Berwyn,
750 F.2d 1383, 1392 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The fundamental problem of a risk bonus is that it
compensates attorneys, indirectly but effectively, for bringing unsuccessful civil rights suits,
even though the attorney’s fee statute is expressly limited to cases where the party seeking the
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the unsuccessful ones, in the sense that only the former will keep the lights on.
Contingent-fee firms take a portfolio-balancing approach to case selection in order
to position themselves to bear the risk presented by the next case; the need to take
those steps supports, rather than undermines, the conclusion that risk-bearing
warrants compensation.
If law firms routinely charged their clients by the hour in contingent-fee cases,
courts would be able to provide compensation for risk by simply using those hourly
rates when calculating the lodestar amount.217 Private contingency arrangements,
however, almost never take the form of a wholly contingent hourly fee.218 The vast
majority of such arrangements take the form of a contingent percentage fee, under
which the law firm receives a percentage of the client’s monetary recovery,
regardless of the number of hours worked.219
Because the percentage fee generally reflects a presumption that the value of a
case can be measured solely in terms of monetary relief, it is a poor fit for statutory
fee-shifting cases, especially those involving injunctive relief or low damages
amounts.220 In such cases, limiting a fee-shifting award to a percentage of the
monetary recovery would undervalue the public benefits of the litigation.221 As the
Supreme Court has recognized, “[u]nlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights
plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be
valued solely in monetary terms.”222

fee prevails.”).
217. Cf. Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1230 (N.J. 1995) (quoting M ARY FRANCES
DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES ¶ 16.04[4][b] (rev. ed.
1990)) (“Determination of the amount by which a lodestar fee should be enhanced to reflect
the risk of nonpayment is conceptually difficult because there is ‘no such thing as a market
hourly rate in contingent litigation.’”).
218. See KRITZER, REPUTATIONS AND REWARDS, supra note 32, at 40; see also Silver, supra
note 20, at 36–37 (describing the contingent hourly fee as a mechanism that “the market
squarely rejects”). As discussed infra Section III.D, some law firms offer partially contingent
hourly rates as an alternative to traditional hourly billing.
219. Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH.
U. L.Q. 739, 740 (2002); see also KRITZER, REPUTATIONS AND REWARDS, supra note 32, at 39.
Under some contingent-fee contracts, the percentage varies according to the stage at which the
case is resolved. See infra note 223. That type of agreement functions like a contingent hourly
rate in the sense that the fee roughly correlates to the number of attorney-hours the case
requires. Even so, it does not set forth an hourly rate that a court could plug into the lodestar.
220. Cf. Dague, 505 U.S. at 565–66 n.* (recognizing the “severe problems of
administration” that would be involved in “determining the value of injunctive relief” for
purposes of awarding a percentage fee in injunction-only fee-shifting cases).
221. See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93 (1989) (rejecting the notion that a
contractual percentage fee should be a cap for a statutory fee-shifting award, as “to hold
otherwise would be inconsistent with the statute and its policy and purpose”).
222. Id. (quoting Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 574 (1986)). Unlike the percentage
approach, the lodestar method decouples the counsel fee from the amount of monetary relief
obtained. See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d
283, 333 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The lodestar method . . . is designed to reward counsel for
undertaking socially beneficial litigation in cases where the expected relief has a small enough
monetary value that a percentage-of-recovery method would provide inadequate
compensation.”).
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The percentages charged on the contingent-fee market typically fall into a narrow
range, between 33 and 40%,223 with a one-third fee being most common.224
Moreover, individual law firms tend not to tailor their percentage rates to the level
of risk presented by each particular case.225 This convergence among and within law
firms suggests that some standardization of risk multipliers in statutory fee-shifting
cases would be appropriate.226
The extent of the convergence, however, should not be overstated. In particular,
because monetary recoveries vary, a relatively standardized percentage does not
mean a relatively standardized fee. A referral process funnels higher-recovery
cases—which yield higher fees—to law firms with stronger capitalization and
expertise.227 The hourly-rate component of the lodestar should already account for
the some of the effects of this sorting by capturing a particular firm’s position in the
referral hierarchy. Some degree of case-specific tailoring would still be appropriate,
however, to reflect that different cases can often be expected to land with different
firms.
In sum, research conducted over the past two decades has demonstrated that
private-market, contingent-fee attorneys commonly provide and receive
compensation for risk-bearing services. Moreover, the mechanics of contingent-fee

223. Kritzer, Dogged Myths, supra note 219, at 740; see also KRITZER, REPUTATIONS AND
REWARDS, supra note 32, at 39. Some firms offer tiered rates based on the stage at which the
case is resolved, with lower percentages attaching to cases settled before trial than for cases
taken up on appeal. KRITZER, REPUTATIONS AND REWARDS, supra note 32, at 40. In the early
days of the American contingency fee, rates often amounted to 50% or more; but for the past
several decades, they have tended to fall into the narrower range described in the text. Marc
Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Discontents, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 469 (1998).
224. See Kritzer, supra note 219, at 757–58 (describing one study finding that 60% of
attorneys charged a one-third percentage fee, and another finding that 55% of attorneys
charged a one-third percentage fee); KRITZER, REPUTATIONS AND REWARDS, supra note 32, at
39 (noting variation in flat and variable percentage rates charged by surveyed attorneys, but
finding that in those cases involving a fixed percentage fee not determined by statute or
regulation, “one-third was by far most common, accounting for 93 percent of the fixed
percentage fees”).
225. But see KRITZER, REPUTATIONS AND REWARDS, supra note 32, at 41 (noting some
attorneys’ willingness to lower their percentage rates for particular cases). Some firms will
also charge different percentage rates for different types of cases (e.g., automobile accidents
versus medical malpractice).
226. The convergence probably reflects legal constraints and market imperfections.
Presumably, most law firms will charge whatever the market will bear and the law will allow.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text. When the former exceeds the latter, percentage
rates can be expected to converge on the legal maximum. For example, a 2017 study of
contingent-fee practice in New York found that “[a]ttorneys’ fees were exactly one-third of
net recovery in most cases.” Helland et al., supra note 32, at 1989. The authors noted that
“[o]ne-third is the maximum allowed by the New York courts, except when a sliding scale fee
is used, which is rare.” Id.
227. A client might initially approach an attorney who lacks the necessary capital or
expertise, or who otherwise does not see a sufficient upside to pursuing that client’s case. Such
an attorney will often refer the client “up the chain” to counsel better able to represent her, or
“down the chain” to counsel with lower opportunity costs. Yeazell, supra note 87, at 707–08.
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practice provide some support for determining risk enhancements on a case-specific
basis.
C. Common-Fund Awards
In class actions for monetary relief, the “common fund” doctrine allows courts to
compensate class counsel by awarding them a portion of the class recovery.228 As
with statutory fee shifting, the court’s charge is to award a “reasonable” fee, and
private-market rates provide the touchstone for reasonableness. 229 Notwithstanding
these similarities, courts follow a different set of rules for calculating common-fund
awards than for statutory fee-shifting awards.230 Most important for present purposes,
federal courts are permitted to include compensation for risk in common-fund
awards.231
Courts use both the lodestar and the percentage method to calculate common-fund
awards, though the latter approach is far more common.232 When courts use the
lodestar method, they are permitted to award compensation for risk by way of a risk
multiplier.233 (This use of risk multipliers is inconsistent with the proposition,
tentatively advanced by the Court in Dague, that the lodestar already compensates
for risk.)234 When courts use the percentage method, they tend to award higher
percentages in high-risk cases than in low- and medium-risk cases. 235 Either way, as
the authors of one study put it, “courts systematically reward risk” in common-fund

228. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (“[A] litigant or a
lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons other than himself or his client
is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.”).
229. See Ratner, supra note 163, at 310 (discussing common-fund awards); supra Section
II.A (discussing statutory fee-shifting awards).
230. See WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15:90 (5th ed., 2015);
see also Ratner, supra note 163, at 279–80 & 280 n.35.
231. See, e.g., Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 967 (9th Cir. 2003) (“As in a statutory
fee-shifting case, a district court in a common fund case can apply the lodestar method to
determine the amount of attorneys’ fees. In common fund cases, however, the court can apply
a risk multiplier when using the lodestar approach.”).
232. See Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller & Roy Germano, Attorneys’ Fees in Class
Actions: 2009-2013, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 937, 945 (2017) (finding that courts used the
percentage method—either alone or with a lodestar cross-check—in about 92% of the class
actions studied, and that courts used the lodestar method alone in about 6% of the class actions
studied); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees and Expenses in Class
Action Settlements, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 248, 267–68 (2010) (finding that courts used
the percentage method—either alone or with a lodestar cross-check—in about 80% of the class
settlements studied, and that courts used the lodestar method alone in about 10% of the class
settlements studied); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and
Their Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 832 (2010) (finding that courts used the
percentage method in 69% and the lodestar method alone in 12% of the class settlements
studied).
233. See, e.g., Staton, 327 F.3d at 967; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 232, at 835.
234. See supra Section II.C; see also supra Section I.B (explaining why the lodestar does
not vary in direct relation to the initial level of litigation risk).
235. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 232, at 278.
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cases.236 They generally do so on the basis of case-specific factors, reasoning that
“[t]he greater the risk of walking away empty-handed, the higher the award must be
to attract competent and energetic counsel.”237
Does the same logic support case-specific compensation for risk under federal
fee-shifting statutes? Answering that question requires an examination of the
differences between the common-fund and fee-shifting contexts. Setting aside the
“prevailing party” restriction,238 the strongest candidate for a relevant distinction
consists of the source of the fee, as the common-fund doctrine “rests on a theory of
sharing the cost among those aligned with the plaintiff rather than extracting it from
the defeated adversary.”239 Common-fund awards thus involve fee spreading rather
than fee shifting.
Drawing on this distinction, the Ninth Circuit has noted that “[i]n common fund
cases, there is no concern about financially burdening a defendant to compensate for
the risk of nonpayment, because the attorney’s fee award is deducted from the
plaintiffs’ fund.”240 On this view, although it is fair to ask absent class members to
share more of the wealth in the event of the plaintiffs’ unlikely win,241 it would not
be fair to ask a defendant to bear more of the cost in the event of the defendant’s
unlikely loss.
This view would carry more weight if: (i) the defendant’s culpability were
proportional to the plaintiff’s initial litigation risk, and (ii) fee-shifting awards were
meant to be proportional to that culpability. If both of those propositions were true,
courts might deem it inappropriate to award higher fees in cases that were in some
sense close—for example, because the defendant’s conduct was not so egregious or
obviously unlawful that the plaintiff’s victory was assured.242 The Third Circuit once
expressed a similar view, opining that “[t]he contingency factor loses its legitimacy
when the penalty imposed on the party at fault is in inverse proportion to his
culpability.”243
Both of the underlying propositions fail. First, litigation risk does not increase in
direct proportion to the defendant’s culpability; in fact, the opposite can be true.
Consider that, although lying is culpable behavior, it can be riskier to sue a police
officer who is willing to lie than one who is committed to telling the truth.244

236. Id. at 265; see also Eisenberg et al., supra note 232, at 958 (finding that “the
association between risk and fee percentage continues in the 2009-2013 data” but “is not as
clear-cut”).
237. Silverman v. Motorola Sols., Inc., 739 F.3d 956, 958 (7th Cir. 2013).
238. For discussion of the “prevailing party” restriction, see supra Sections III.A & III.B.
239. Rowe, supra note 106, at 662.
240. Fischel v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of U.S., 307 F.3d 997, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002).
241. Id.
242. See Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d 670, 673 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Where, as in this
case, the award is statutory, the assessment of a counsel fee is to some extent a penalty for
violating the law. From the defendant’s standpoint, then, it is inconsistent to increase the fee
when the defendant’s liability was doubtful, but reduce it when the violation was flagrant and
easily proved.”).
243. Id.
244. Such a willingness to lie is disturbingly common. See Rachel Moran, Contesting
Police Credibility, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1342 (2018) (“[T]he phenomenon of police
officers lying at trial is so well documented that it has its own euphemism, ‘testilying’ . . . .”).
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Similarly, although witness intimidation is culpable behavior, it can be riskier to sue
a sexual harasser who has silenced or intimidated his other victims than one who has
admitted wrongdoing and attempted to make amends.245 Moreover, even if a
defendant has engaged in egregious behavior—for example, by forcing a prisoner to
sleep naked on the floor in cells “teeming with human waste” for six days246—he
might have a plausible argument that an affirmative defense, statutory exception, or
immunity doctrine protects him from liability.247 Not all paths to a potential defense
victory run through morally vindicating terrain, yet all initially present some amount
of risk, even if the plaintiff ultimately prevails.
Second, the purpose of a fee-shifting statute is not to heap additional punishment
on a losing defendant, but “to ensure ‘effective access to the judicial process’ for
persons with civil rights grievances.”248 Consistent with this purpose, courts properly
focus on the plaintiff rather than the defendant when calculating a fee-shifting
award—asking questions like the extent to which the plaintiff prevailed, the number
of hours the plaintiff’s attorneys reasonably spent on the litigation, and the
reasonable hourly rates of the plaintiff’s attorneys.249 The overall question is what a
claimant would need in order to secure effective representation on the private market.
If the market generally requires higher fees for successful but initially higher-risk
cases, then any culpability-based “concern[s] about financially burdening a
defendant to compensate for the risk of nonpayment”250 are simply beside the point.
In sum, courts routinely award case-specific compensation for risk in commonfund cases, and differences between the two contexts do not compel a different result
in statutory fee-shifting cases.

Counsel wishing to challenge an officer’s credibility, however, face serious obstacles in
obtaining and presenting the evidence necessary to do so effectively. Id. at 1342–43.
245. Cf. Susan Faludi, ‘She Said’ Recounts How Two Times Reporters Broke the Harvey
Weinstein Story, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08
/books/review/she-said-jodi-kantor-megan-twohey.html
[https://perma.cc/4YVS-HEAC]
(discussing the months of investigation required to publish a story about Harvey Weinstein,
who has since been accused by more than 80 women of sexual misconduct over a period of
decades); Jennifer Szalai, In ‘Catch and Kill,’ Ronan Farrow Recounts Chasing Harvey
Weinstein Story, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11
/books/review-catch-kill-ronan-farrow-harvey-weinstein.html
[https://perma.cc/E4HVEG39] (describing the pressure brought to bear against reporting on the Weinstein allegations).
246. Taylor v. Stevens, 946 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 2019). The defendant prison officials won
summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, see id. at 222, but they could hardly
claim blamelessness.
247. Cf. Menocal v. GEO Grp., Inc., 320 F.R.D. 258, 264 (D. Colo. 2017), aff’d, 882 F.3d
905 (10th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 143 (2018) (detailing that immigration detainees
alleged that for-profit detention facility forced them to clean toilets, showers, and other
common areas without pay, and defendant argued that a “civic duty” exception to the forced
labor statute made its actions lawful).
248. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1558,
pt. 1 (1976)).
249. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429.
250. Fischel, 307 F.3d at 1008.
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D. Alternative Fee Arrangements
Unlike contingent percentage fees and common-fund awards, traditional hourly
billing results in compensation regardless of whether the client wins or loses, and the
amount of the compensation does not depend on the extent of the client’s success.
The billable-hour mechanism has drawn criticism on multiple grounds,251 and in
response, private law firms have increasingly offered alternative fee arrangements
(AFAs) to their clients.252 Particularly relevant here, some AFAs aim to better align
law firm and client incentives by requiring the firm to take on some of the client’s
risk of loss.253
One type of risk-sharing AFA is sometimes called a “partial contingency fee.”254
Pursuant to this arrangement, a law firm receives a lower-than-usual fee on a noncontingent basis, plus a contingent bonus payable upon the achievement of specified
goals.255 For example, the law firm O’Melveny & Myers recently agreed to a risksharing AFA when representing a defendant in connection with an anti-SLAPP
motion and motion to dismiss.256 The agreement provided that the defendant would
pay an up-front flat fee of $25,000, which the firm would keep regardless of the
outcome.257 If the defendant’s motions were granted, it would then pay a “success
fee” amounting to 150% of the firm’s regular rates.258 The firm later explained that
“[t]he potential for the additional recovery beyond standard rates compensated for
the risk O’Melveny undertook,” and that the 50% premium was “in line with the
success fee premiums sought in other cases with similar amounts of risk.”259 This
example suggests both that the private market attaches monetary value to riskbearing services, and that the value of those services is tied (in at least some
instances) to case-specific factors.260

251. See, e.g., A.B.A, ABA COMMISSION ON BILLABLE HOURS REPORT 2001-2002 (2002);
WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR: THE ETHICS OF TIME-BASED BILLING BY ATTORNEYS
(1996); David Graeler & Thomas D. Long, The End of the Hour, L.A. LAW., Sept. 2014,
at 28.
252. Ellen Freedman, Alternative Fee Arrangements: Not a Passing Fad, PA. LAW.,
July/August 2017 (discussing a study in which “[o]ver 94 percent of surveyed firms reported
using some form(s) of non-hourly billing”); see also Peggy Kubicz Hall, I’ve Looked at Fees
from Both Sides Now: A Perspective on Market-Valued Pricing for Legal Services, 39 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 154, 156 n.2, 226 (2012) (noting the “decided trend against the use of
billable hours for legal services”).
253. See ALM LEGAL INTELLIGENCE, WHO REALLY DRIVES AFA USE—AND WHY?
9 (2015).
254. See Brief for Law and Economics Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 10–11, Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (2009) (No. 08-970), 2009 WL
2777659.
255. Id.
256. Open Source Sec., Inc. v. Perens, No. 17-CV-04002-LB, 2018 WL 2762637, at *1–2
(N.D. Cal. June 9, 2018).
257. Id.
258. Id. The flat fee would be credited against this success fee. Id.
259. Id. (emphasis added).
260. Similarly, in Kirkland & Ellis’s version of the partial contingency fee, the firm
“receives a portion of its hourly rate plus a smaller percentage of any recoveries in the lawsuit.”
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The Supreme Court discussed risk-sharing AFAs in its 2010 decision in Perdue
v. Kenny A.261 There, the district court had awarded a lodestar enhancement for
counsel’s “superior performance and results.”262 The Court rejected the plaintiffs’
argument that the performance enhancement was analogous to a partial contingency
fee,263 reasoning that
[a]n attorney who agrees, at the outset of the representation, to a reduced
hourly rate in exchange for the opportunity to earn a performance bonus
is in a position far different from an attorney in a § 1988 case who is
compensated at the full prevailing rate and then seeks a performance
enhancement in addition to the lodestar amount after the litigation has
concluded.264
Whatever the merits of the Court’s analysis with respect to performance
enhancements, its opinion does not bear on the correctness of the assertion I make
here, which is that risk-sharing AFAs weigh in favor of case-specific compensation
for risk in statutory fee-shifting cases. Performance enhancement depends on
whether, viewing the litigation on an ex post basis, counsel performed the contracted
services so much better than expected (e.g. in light of the attorneys’ relative
inexperience) that additional compensation is appropriate.265 By contrast, risk
enhancement depends on whether, viewing the litigation on an ex ante basis, counsel
has agreed to provide risk-bearing services that independently warrant
compensation.266
Similarly, the Court viewed the inquiry with respect to performance
enhancements as whether a firm should receive a “bonus” relative to its standard rate
of compensation. By contrast, the inquiry with respect to risk is whether an
adjustment is necessary to ensure that the law firm is in fact “compensated at the full
prevailing rate” for the specific risk-bearing services it agreed to provide. As
explained above, risk-sharing AFAs suggest that the answer to that question is yes.

KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, ALTERNATIVE FEE ARRANGEMENTS AND LITIGATION FINANCE 2.
Because it ties the risk premium to the amount of the actual recovery, this AFA depends on
case-specific factors. See Kubicz Hall, supra note 252, at 210–11 (counseling those
considering AFAs to recognize that “[e]very project has risks” and to consider the extent to
which “a fair price should reflect those risks”).
261. 559 U.S. 542, 556–57 (2010) (describing an AFA in which “attorneys are paid at a
reduced hourly rate but receive a bonus if certain specified results are obtained”).
262. Id. at 546.
263. Id. at 556–57.
264. Id. (emphasis in the original).
265. See id. at 543 (noting that a performance enhancement may be appropriate, when an
attorney’s hourly rate has been determined solely on the basis of years since admission to the
bar, if that method “does not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value, as
demonstrated in part during the litigation”).
266. When a plaintiff obtains a successful result in spite of the risks initially presented by
a case, “the outcome may be attributable to superior performance and commitment of
resources by plaintiff’s counsel,” but it might also result from “simple luck.” Id. at 554.
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E. Third-Party Litigation Funding
Like the law firms in the previous contexts, a lender engaged in third-party
litigation funding (TPLF) provides risk-bearing services in connection with
litigation.267 TPLF refers to an arrangement in which an outside entity (i.e. neither a
party nor counsel for a party) “finances the party’s legal representation in anticipation
of making a profit.”268 Particularly relevant here, one form of TPLF involves
plaintiff-side, case-specific, nonrecourse loans.269 In this type of loan, if the case
results in no recovery, the borrower owes the lender nothing;270 but if the plaintiff
prevails, the lender recovers the initial investment plus a substantial fee.271 The TPLF
provider does not represent the plaintiff as legal counsel; it will not draft a complaint,
file motions, or appear in court on her behalf.272 Instead, the lender funds the
plaintiff’s case and assumes the risk of loss. It thus provides only the risk-bearing
services typically provided by a law firm in a statutory fee-shifting case (or in a
common-fund or contingent-percentage-fee case.)273

267. This form of lending is also known as alternative litigation finance, or “ALF.” See,
e.g., J. Maria Glover, A Regulatory Theory of Legal Claims, 70 VAND. L. REV. 221, 246 (2017)
(using the terms interchangeably).
268. Victoria Shannon Sahani, Judging Third-Party Funding, 63 UCLA L. REV. 388, 392
(2016). The lender “could be a bank, hedge fund, insurance company, or some other entity
or individual.” Id. I do not discuss here other potential forms of litigation finance,
including consumer lending, in which individual plaintiffs receive direct loans to cover living
costs pending an expected recovery. See STEVEN GARBER, RAND CORPORATION,
ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES, KNOWNS, AND
UNKNOWNS 9–12 (2010).
269. Nora Freeman Engstrom, Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63 DEPAUL L.
REV. 377, 394 (2014). I focus on plaintiff-side lending because it is most relevant to the
question of compensation for risk in statutory fee-shifting cases, in addition to being where
most TPLF activity has occurred. See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim is this Anyway? ThirdParty Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1277 (2011) (noting that TPLF has largely
been aimed at plaintiffs, though there is a trend toward making it available to corporate
defendants).
270. The borrower can be either the plaintiff or her law firm. GARBER, supra note 268,
at 15–16.
271. Engstrom, supra note 269, at 394–95. Both TPLF and statutory fee-shifting
representation involve a nonrecourse loan of some sort: A TPLF provider loans the recipient
money to cover the attorneys’ fees and/or direct costs of the litigation, and a law firm
representing a fee-shifting plaintiff “loans” the client both its attorneys’ labor and the direct
costs of the litigation. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 534 (2007) (“The
contingent fee compensates the lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but for the
loan of those services.”).
272. To the contrary, “in most states within the United States, lawyers must keep their
distance somewhat from the funder.” Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party
Litigation Funding Regulation, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 907 (2015).
273. Engstrom, supra note 269, at 395; see also Maya Steinitz, Incorporating Legal
Claims, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1155, 1160 (2015) (“[W]hile contingency lawyers do provide
financing, they primarily provide lawyering services. . . . . Conversely, funders are financiers
only.”).
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“Legal claims are notoriously difficult to value,”274 and the expected value of the
claim is central to the value of the TPLF transaction.275 Accordingly, these funders
engage in a significant amount of due diligence before taking on any particular
case.276 In at least some instances, the due diligence process determines not only
whether the lender will agree to fund the litigation, but also what rates it will charge.
As funder Bentham IMF puts it, “returns vary by the deal.”277 Similarly, funder
Burford Capital states that its transactions are “individually negotiated.”278 It notes
that those transactions “often entitle [Burford] to the return of our invested capital, a
minimum return on that capital, and a portion of the total proceeds of the
litigation.”279 The TPLF market thus provides some support for a case-specific
approach to compensation for risk in federal statutory fee-shifting cases.
Because of the time and expense involved in these due-diligence processes,
however, the TPLF market also suggests that case-specific multipliers could raise
serious administrability concerns. TPLF provider Burford Capital, for example,
reports that its due diligence process “typically takes at least 60 days.”280 TPLF
provider Juridica, which describes a similar time frame, reports that it “spends an
average of $75,000–$100,000 for each screening.”281 Requiring a similar level of
analysis for the purpose of setting a case-specific risk multiplier would place a heavy
burden on courts and litigants.
To be clear, I am not arguing that TPLF lenders are interested in financing
statutory fee-shifting litigation. I assume that, like profit-motivated law firms, they
will be highly unlikely to do so unless the case also happens to involve a large
potential monetary recovery.282 But these lenders focus on complex cases, and
Congress intended that statutory fee-shifting awards should “be governed by the

274. Steinitz, supra note 273, at 1171.
275. See Panel 1: Litigation Funding Basics, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 511, 515–18 (2016)
(comments of Lee Drucker, co-founder of third-party lender Lake Whillans).
276. Burford Capital, for example, states that “[d]oing our own diligence is core to our
business model,” and that its “Investment Committee alone has more than 300 collective years
of commercial litigation experience.” What Does Burford Do?, BURFORD,
https://www.burfordcapital.com/faqs/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20190913142718/https://
www.burfordcapital.com/faqs/].
277. Generating Multi-Million Dollar Revenues with Funding, BENTHAM IMF,
https://www.benthamimf.com/funding/case-studies/case-study/generating-multi-million-doll
ar-revenues-with-funding [https://perma.cc/V75Z-LH75].
278. What Does Burford Do?, supra note 276.
279. Id.
280. Ashley Keller & Katharine Wolanyk, What You Need To Do Before Obtaining IP
Litigation Financing, BURFORD (June 26, 2017), https://www.burfordcapital.com/mediaroom/media-room-container/what-you-need-to-do-before-obtaining-ip-litigation-financing/
[https://perma.cc/5R57-6T8G].
281. Ralph Lindeman, Third-Party Investors Offer New Funding Source for Major
Commercial Lawsuits, BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS: DAILY REPORTS FOR EXECUTIVES (Mar.
5, 2010), https://fulbrookmanagement.com/third-party-investors-offer-new-funding-source
-for-major-commercial-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/UA3X-9PS2].
282. See supra Section II.D. Cf. Yeazell, supra note 32, at 204 (describing a TPLF provider
that “wishe[d] at all costs to avoid plaintiffs who are litigating ‘on principle,’ rather than on
the basis of maximizing cash recovery”).
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same standards which prevail in other types of equally complex [f]ederal litigation
. . . and not be reduced because the rights involved may be nonpecuniary in
nature.”283 It is therefore reasonable to look to TPLF for insights about the value of
risk-bearing services in statutory fee-shifting cases. Moreover, TPLF represents a
conceptually useful unbundling of compensation for risk: start with the services
typically provided to a statutory fee-shifting plaintiff, subtract the services typically
provided to a client under standard hourly billing, and what you have left over is
essentially TPLF.
In sum, TPLF further demonstrates that the market assigns value to risk-bearing
services associated with litigation. The cost of those risk-bearing services depends
on case-specific factors, at least some of the time, but the case-specific evaluation of
risk requires significant time and expense.
IV. EVALUATING THE ALTERNATIVES
The previous Part found that state fee-shifting awards, contingent percentage fees,
common-fund awards, alternative fee arrangements, and third-party litigation
funding provide support for the proposition that statutory fee-shifting awards should
include case-specific compensation for risk. This Part turns to specific methods that
courts could use to provide that compensation. The analysis draws on the logistics of
those other mechanisms, but it also recognizes the need to avoid the market gaps they
reflect, especially with respect to cases that involve only injunctive relief or relatively
low amounts of damages. The goal of this Part is to identify one or more approaches
that would be workable and fair, both to plaintiffs and to defendants, especially in
the context of injunctive and negative-value claims.
A. Stage-Specific Risk Multipliers
Risk is generally not uniform over the timeline of a particular case. A claim’s
probability of success changes continuously, but with reasonably predictable
inflection points, including after a motion to dismiss, motion for summary judgment,
or trial. Once a claim has survived a motion for summary judgment, for example, it
will generally have a higher likelihood of success than it did at the time it was filed. 284
This lack of uniformity over time raises the question whether courts should apply
different risk multipliers for work performed at different stages of a particular case.
The contingent-percentage fee might at first appear to support an affirmative
answer to that question, because some private-market contingency arrangements
make the percentage rate dependent upon the point at which the litigation is
resolved.285 For example, a retainer agreement might provide for counsel to receive
40% of the recovery if the case goes to trial, 33% of a recovery obtained after the

283. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 893 (1984) (quoting S. REP. NO. 94–1011, pt. 6
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913).
284. On the one hand, this higher likelihood of success might increase the plaintiff’s
bargaining position with respect to both merits relief and attorney’s fees. On the other hand,
the defendant might be in a position to respond by making a sacrifice offer or engaging in
strategic capitulation. See supra Section I.A.
285. See supra note 223.
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denial of a motion to dismiss, or 25% of a recovery obtained at an earlier phase. That
structure, however, primarily reflects that earlier-resolving cases generally require
counsel to work fewer overall hours than later-resolving cases. Because the lodestar
already accounts for the number of hours spent on a case, the logic of stage-specific
contingent percentage fees does not shed light on the appropriateness of stagespecific risk multipliers for statutory fee-shifting awards.
Making the multiplier uniform across the duration of the litigation, as opposed to
applying different multipliers for different stages, finds some justification in the
commitment a law firm makes to a fee-shifting client when taking on the
representation. As noted previously, litigation risk in fee-shifting cases should be
viewed from the perspective of a law firm deciding whether to represent a
claimant.286 At that point, the firm may have an initial estimate of the claimant’s
likelihood of success, but it does not yet know what will happen at later stages of the
litigation. If the firm accepts the representation, it nonetheless agrees to see the whole
thing through, and not to abandon the client while the litigation remains ongoing.287
Because of the undercompensatory status quo, an abandoned fee-shifting client
would likely face tremendous difficulty finding new counsel.288 Imagine what would
happen, though, if statutory fee-shifting were working well. Under those
circumstances, for-profit counsel would be more interested in representing feeshifting claimants, and one firm’s abandonment of such a claimant might lead to
another firm stepping in. When a law firm entered a case at some post-filing stage of
the litigation, it would likely make sense for the fee-shifting award to reflect the risk
as it appeared at that later point in time.289 This analysis suggests that stage-specific
risk multipliers might be appropriate for statutory fee-shifting awards.
The best argument against stage-specific risk multipliers sounds in
administrability and predictability. As noted previously, when it rejected
compensation for risk, the Supreme Court expressed concern that risk enhancements
“would make the setting of fees more complex and arbitrary, hence more
unpredictable, and hence more litigable.”290 To the extent that this concern has any
validity for a case-specific approach,291 it carries greater force for a stage-specific
approach. The latter would require a court both to assign multiplier values to the risk
presented at multiple stages of the case, and to disaggregate the lodestar into the

286. See supra Section I.B.
287. Ethical rules limit the circumstances under which an attorney can terminate
representation. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16(b) (2018).
288. Unless, that is, the claim involved a sufficient amount of monetary relief to attract
counsel under a contingent percentage-fee arrangement. See supra Section II.D.
289. Analogously, a TPLF lender that invests at a post-filing stage of litigation presumably
conducts due diligence with respect to the current state of the claims, rather than pretending
to be ignorant of the current level of risk. Cf. Lindeman, supra note 281 (reporting that TPLF
provider Juridica “has no preferred stage of litigation at which to become involved in a case”
and “has taken cases that were freshly filed, on the eve of trial, as well on appeal”).
290. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992).
291. See supra notes 201–03 and accompanying text (noting that the Florida Supreme
Court has rejected this concern as unsupported); see also infra Section IV.B.2 (discussing an
approach to case-specific multipliers designed to minimize this concern).
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amounts associated with each of those stages.292 Administrability and predictability
thus weigh against determining and applying different multipliers for every stage of
fee-shifting litigation.293
Two stages seem sufficiently distinct from the rest of the litigation process,
however, to justify the hit to administrability and predictability. The first is merits
appeals. Appellate work is in some ways more specialized and compartmentalized
than the different stages of trial-level work, suggesting that applying an appellate risk
multiplier would be both warranted and feasible. Moreover, depending on the
standard of review and the party in whose favor judgment was entered, the appeal
may involve more or less risk to the plaintiff than the trial-court proceedings.
Consider the following analysis by the Oregon Court of Appeals:
Appellate work is not identical to trial work. As the prevailing party at
trial and the respondent on appeal, plaintiffs were entitled to certain
favorable standards of review. The prosecution of the case at trial was
more risky than the defense of the judgments on appeal. In addition,
plaintiffs’ efforts in arguing from a closed record on appeal cannot be
equated with their efforts in creating that record at trial.294
The court thus awarded the plaintiffs a multiplier of 1.6 for work done on appeal,
notwithstanding that they received a multiplier of 2.25 for work performed in the
trial court.295 It would seem appropriate, at least in some circumstances, for federal
fee-shifting plaintiffs to receive a different multiplier for appellate work as well.
The second sufficiently distinct stage of litigation involves post-decree
monitoring and enforcement. A judgment does not automatically result in changed
conditions on the ground, so after a court enters an injunction or consent decree,
plaintiffs’ counsel will often need to take further steps to ensure the defendant’s
compliance.296 In a fee-shifting case, those monitoring and enforcement activities
will often be compensable. To the extent that liability has been finalized, however,
those activities involve far less risk of nonpayment than work performed in earlier
stages of litigation.297 Moreover, the nature and timing of monitoring and
enforcement should make the disaggregation of those hours from prejudgment and
appellate work relatively straightforward. Accordingly, applying a distinct multiplier
to these compliance activities seems appropriate as well.
In sum, courts should not vary the pre-judgment risk multiplier for a particular
case. It would be reasonable, however, to apply different multipliers for the appellate
and postdecree compliance stages than for the prejudgment phase.

292. If uniform (as opposed to case-specific) multipliers were used for different stages of
litigation, part of the calculation would be simplified. See infra Section IV.C. The need for
stage-specific disaggregation of the lodestar, however, would remain.
293. Mortgage payments offer a useful analogy; the lender’s risk decreases as the
borrower’s equity goes up and the number of remaining payments goes down, but making the
interest rate vary with those factors would introduce unwarranted complexity.
294. Strawn v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 226 P.3d 86, 96 (Or. Ct. App. 2010).
295. Id. The trial work was compensated pursuant to the common-fund doctrine, while the
appellate work was compensated pursuant to a fee-shifting statute. See id. at 93.
296. See Schlanger, supra note 173, at 74.
297. Id. at 74, 79 n.2.

1064

IN DIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 95:1021

B. Case-Specific Risk Multipliers
The question whether risk multipliers should be stage-specific (such that more
than one multiplier would apply within any given case) is distinct from the question
whether they should be case-specific (such that different multipliers would apply to
different cases).298 As noted previously, the mechanisms discussed in Part III
generally involve case-specific variations in compensation for risk.
Courts and commentators have identified significant concerns with case-specific
multipliers,299 but many of those problems could be mitigated (though not
eliminated) by implementation choices. The discussion that follows will explain
how, under the following potential approach, that mitigation could occur:300
Table 1: Potential Case-Specific Approach to Risk Multipliers
Initial probability of
complete success
20%
50%
80%

Risk multiplier
2.5
1.8
1.25

1. Timing and Relevant Considerations
Although this approach turns on the plaintiff’s initial probability of complete
success, as viewed from the standpoint of a reasonable attorney deciding whether to
accept the representation,301 the court need not evaluate that probability at the outset
of the litigation. Such ex ante evaluation occurs in the contingent percentage fee,
TPLF, and ALF contexts, but in those contexts, the provider and evaluator of

298. A further question, which is beyond the scope of this Article, is whether risk
multipliers should apply to costs as well as the lodestar. For a discussion of cost multipliers in
the context of common-fund awards, see Ratner & Rubenstein, supra note 22, at 609–11.
299. See supra Sections II.B–C.
300. For accessibility purposes, I note that the table describes a risk multiplier of 2.5 for
cases with a 20% initial probability of complete success, a risk multiplier of 1.8 for cases with
a 50% initial probability of complete success, and a risk multiplier of 1.25 for cases with an
80% initial probability of complete success.
301. Cf. Fischel v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of U.S., 307 F.3d 997, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002)
(common-fund case) (“We hold that risk should be assessed when an attorney determines that
there is merit to the client’s claim and elects to pursue the claim on the client’s behalf. This
will likely occur before a lawsuit is filed.”); Joyce v. Federated Nat’l Ins. Co., 228 So. 3d
1122, 1133 (Fla. 2017) (state fee-shifting case) (“[T]he lodestar amount, which awards an
attorney for the work performed on the case, is properly analyzed through the hindsight of the
actual outcome of the case, whereas the contingency fee multiplier, which is intended to
incentivize the attorney to take a potentially difficult or complex case, is properly analyzed
through the same lens as the attorney when making the decision to take the case.”). If stagespecific multipliers are used, see supra Section IV.A, the viewpoint would be that of a
reasonable attorney deciding whether to enter the lawsuit at the beginning of the relevant stage.
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information are on the same side of the “v.” Federal fee-shifting is in that sense more
similar to the state fee-shifting and common-fund contexts; there, the court must rely
on the parties for the adversarial presentation of information, and the entire feesetting process usually takes place after the litigation has ended. That timing raises
concerns about predictability and hindsight bias, but it helps to avoid the conflicts of
interest that could otherwise arise between plaintiffs and their counsel.302
Although a court would make this estimate after the merits case had ended, it
should consider only the information that would have been available after a
reasonable pre-filing investigation.303 Moreover, to avoid inviting duplicity or
creating conflicts of interest for plaintiffs’ counsel,304 the estimate should be based
on relatively objective considerations that (at the time of the fee petition) no longer
affect the merits. For example, those case-specific considerations might include the
following: whether the plaintiff’s claim could only succeed through a change to
existing precedent, whether this claimant or any other plaintiffs had prevailed in
similar claims against this defendant,305 whether other law firms had declined to
represent the plaintiff in this case or to sue the same defendant in other cases,306 the
extent to which the underlying issues implicate the defendant’s broader business
interests,307 or how often defendants prevail outright in cases brought under this
substantive law.308 This analysis would not entail a balancing test, with the goal of
determining some abstract idea of reasonableness, but an evaluation of case

302. See supra Section II.B (discussing the possibility of such conflicts of interest).
303. The probability determination should reflect that if a reasonable attorney would doubt
her ability to evaluate the case’s likelihood of success, her willingness to take on the case
would be correspondingly diminished. Attorneys often do have such doubts, as demonstrated
by the rise of technologies like quantitative legal prediction. See generally Daniel Martin Katz,
Quantitative Legal Prediction-or-How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for
the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909 (2013). At some
point, those technologies might prove useful to the calculation of risk multipliers, but they are
not yet reliable enough to serve that purpose. See Jason Tashea, Algorithms Fall Short in
Predicting Litigation Outcomes, 104 A.B.A. J. 32, 32 (2018); see also MP McQueen, How
Legal Departments Are Using New Data Tools, Tactics to Fight Megaverdicts, CORP.
COUNSEL (Dec. 2, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/2019/12/02/how-legaldepartments-are-using-new-data-tools-tactics-to-fight-megaverdicts/?slreturn=20200104193
834 [https://perma.cc/CZ5P-X8UR] (describing the use of quantitative tools to supplement,
rather than supplant, attorney’s risk evaluations).
304. See supra Section II.B (discussing these concerns).
305. Cf. Keller & Wolanyk, supra note 280 (noting that prospective borrowers should be
prepared to inform a TPLF provider about “any relevant prior litigation”).
306. See, e.g., Silverman v. Motorola Sols., Inc., 739 F.3d 956, 958 (7th Cir. 2013)
(common-fund case) (“When this suit got under way, no other law firm was willing to serve
as lead counsel. Lack of competition not only implies a higher fee but also suggests that most
members of the securities bar saw this litigation as too risky for their practices.”).
307. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Palma, 555 So. 2d 836, 837–38 (Fla. 1990)
(state fee-shifting case) (deeming it relevant to the risk assessment that the defendant was
willing to “go to the mat” because of the importance of the underlying issue to its broader
business interests).
308. See, e.g., Palma, 555 So. 2d at 958 (deeming it relevant to the risk assessment that
“[d]efendants prevail outright in many securities suits”).
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characteristics that bear on the discrete factual question of the plaintiff’s initial
probability of success.
2. Range of Multiplier Values
The multiplier values (2.5, 1.8, and 1.25) draw primarily from the federal
common-fund and state fee-shifting contexts.309 In common-fund cases, courts can
set multipliers based on litigation risk as well as other considerations,310 and “most
multipliers are in the relatively modest 1–2 range.”311 Compared to the approach
discussed here, the floor is somewhat lower in common-fund cases, as some fee
awards fall “at or just below counsel’s lodestar.”312 The ceiling is also somewhat
higher, as dozens of reported cases involve multipliers greater than 3.5,313 and some
cases involve multipliers greater than 6.314
The multipliers awarded in federal common-fund cases tend to be higher than the
risk multipliers awarded under state fee-shifting statutes. In connection with the
latter, for example, the Supreme Court of Florida has authorized multipliers up to
2.5.315 For their part, the New Jersey and Hawaii Supreme Courts have imposed a

309. Under this potential approach, no case would receive a risk multiplier higher than 2.5.
The imposition of a ceiling addresses concerns raised in the federal common-fund and state
fee-shifting contexts, where courts have recognized the absurdity that could result if the risk
multiplier were permitted to scale up indefinitely. For example, the Seventh Circuit has argued
that “the logic of scaling the fee to the risk leads to absurdity if pressed too hard: it would
justify an astronomical fee in a frivolous suit in which the plaintiff prevailed by a fluke.” In re
Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 629 F.3d 741, 746 (7th Cir. 2011). One can agree with this
general idea without accepting the proposition that a case can be deemed frivolous even if the
plaintiff prevails.
310. For a discussion of the common-fund doctrine, see supra Section III.C.
311. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 15:87 (5th ed. 2019). Much
of the empirical research in this area focuses on cases in which courts calculate the lodestar
and compare it to the percentage amount as a “cross-check.” See id.; see also Eisenberg &
Miller, supra note 232, at 267 (explaining that “[i]f the percentage fee grossly exceeds the
lodestar amount, the fee may be deemed excessive, and the courts can adjust the fee downward
to a more reasonable range”). One study found a mean lodestar multiplier of 1.48 (i.e., an
average 48% increase over the lodestar amount), Eisenberg et al., supra note 232, at 965;
another found a mean lodestar multiplier of 1.65, Fitzpatrick, supra note 232, at 834; and
another found a mean lodestar multiplier of 1.81, Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 232, at 272.
312. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 311, § 15:89.
313. Id.
314. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 232, at 834.
315. See Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 834 (Fla. 1990) (“If the
trial court determines that success was more likely than not at the outset, it may apply a
multiplier of 1 to 1.5; if the trial court determines that the likelihood of success was
approximately even at the outset, the trial judge may apply a multiplier of 1.5 to 2.0; and if the
trial court determines that success was unlikely at the outset of the case, it may apply a
multiplier of 2.0 to 2.5.”); see also Joyce v. Federated Nat’l Ins. Co., 228 So. 3d 1122, 1123
(Fla. 2017) (reaffirming Quanstrom).
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ceiling of 2 (i.e., doubling) for risk multipliers under their state fee-shifting
statutes,316 at least in nonclass cases.317
Some AFAs and TPLF agreements also involve multiplier-like mechanisms, but
the details of those transactions are rarely made public.318 That opacity makes it
difficult to draw on the AFA and TPLF contexts for specific insights into appropriate
multiplier values in federal fee-shifting cases.319 Some public information, however,
suggests that the multiplier values discussed here might be somewhat similar to
TPLF rates. For example, a 2009 lawsuit revealed that a law firm “agreed to pay back
[TPLF provider Augusta Capital] not only the funded litigation expenses, but also a
stipulated funding fee which ranged from 75% to 125% of the funded amount.”320
That fee would roughly correspond to a multiplier value between 1.75 and 2.25,
putting it in the same ballpark as the range discussed here.
3. Quantization of Probability Values
This potential approach would not require a court to identify the risk initially
presented by a case with mathematical exactitude. Instead, a court would choose
which of the three buckets most accurately reflected the litigation’s initial probability
of complete success.321 Multiple benefits flow from this quantization. First, because

316. See Schefke v. Reliable Collection Agency, Ltd., 32 P.3d 52, 100 (Haw. 2001);
Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1231 (N.J. 1995).
317. Some lower courts in New Jersey have applied higher multipliers when issuing feeshifting awards in class actions. See Bruce D. Greenberg, Attorneys’ Fees in New Jersey Class
Actions, 2015 N.J. LAW. 69, 69. Doing so could have a positive effect on plaintiffs’ incentives
to pursue class treatment, especially in injunction-only cases. See Maureen Carroll,
Aggregation for Me, but Not for Thee: The Rise of Common Claims in Non-Class Litigation,
36 CARDOZO L. REV. 2017, 2079–81 (2015).
318. With regard to TPLF, the available information might soon increase. See, e.g., Maya
Steinitz, Follow the Money? A Proposed Approach for Disclosure of Litigation Finance
Agreements, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1073, 1077 (2019) (discussing proposed legislation that
“would require disclosure of litigation funding arrangements in class actions and multidistrict
litigation in federal courts to the court and to all parties”).
319. Maya Steinitz, How Much Is That Lawsuit in the Window? Pricing Legal Claims, 66
VAND. L. REV. 1889, 1900 (2013) (“The nascent third-party funding industry lacks
transparency, and the content of funding agreements, in particular, is highly guarded
proprietary information.”); see also Matthew Bultman, 3rd-Party Funding Finding A Home in
Patent Litigation, LAW 360 (Sept. 29, 2017, 4:22 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles
/959672/3rd-party-funding-finding-a-home-in-patent-litigation
[https://perma.cc/54JQQ68D] (“It’s difficult to pinpoint how many patent cases involve third-party funders because
the deals are often kept under wraps with nondisclosure agreements.”).
320. Augusta Capital, LLC v. Reich & Binstock, LLP, No. 3:09-CV-0103, 2009 WL
2065555, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. July 10, 2009); see also Selvyn Seidel, Timothy Scrantom, Alan
Zimmerman, Lee Drucker, John Desmarais & Radek Goral, Panel 1: Litigation Funding
Basics, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 511, 528 (2016) (comments of John Desmarais, contingent-fee
attorney) (describing agreements Desmaris has seen in which the funding company will
receive “a return of either twice their money or three times their money from the first dollars
from any settlement”).
321. The use of three buckets resembles a quantitative-analysis product that “evaluates
claims coming into a legal department and codes them red, yellow or green like a traffic light”
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evaluation of this type of litigation risk is extremely difficult,322 attempts at finegrained accuracy would come at a high cost to judicial economy.323 There is no
reason to think that federal judges have any particular expertise with regard to
evaluating litigation risk, and there would be no reason to expect that they could do
it easily or well.324 In addition, limiting the options mitigates the concern that casespecific risk enhancements “would make the setting of fees more complex and
arbitrary, hence more unpredictable, and hence more litigable.”325 Allowing only
three options certainly does not eliminate the possibility that courts will make an
arbitrary or questionable choice, but as compared to asking courts to choose among
the full range of probability values, it does reduce the costs to judicial economy and
predictability.
Limiting the number of options also constrains, though does not eliminate, the
costs that a party might bear because of judicial error. For a defendant, the worstcase scenario would be the low-risk case that a court erroneously classifies as highrisk. For a plaintiff, the worst-case scenario would be the high-risk case that the court
erroneously classifies as low risk. Under the approach discussed here, such errors
would lead to the fee award being inappropriately halved or doubled—a significant
effect, to be sure, but a bounded one.
At the same time, limiting the number of risk-multiplier options would also have
costs. Most significantly, it would reduce the court’s flexibility to make the multiplier
value reflect the risk associated with the particular case. It might also increase the
imprecision involved in the risk evaluation, because some cases will not have an
initial probability of complete success that falls at one of the predetermined points.
Any choice of a particular number of options will reflect a balance between these
concerns about flexibility and precision, on the one hand, and concerns about
administrability and predictability, on the other.326
Most of the cases in which courts issue federal statutory fee-shifting awards would
likely fall into the 50% bucket. Few plaintiff-side law firms are in a position to be
truly risk neutral rather than risk averse, making them unlikely to bring many cases
in which they have a less than 50% likelihood of success. Similarly, few defendants
are in a position to be truly risk neutral rather than risk averse, making them likely

based on the level of risk they present to the defendant. See McQueen, supra note 303.
322. See Osbeck, supra note 19, at 41 (“[N]otwithstanding its enormous importance to the
practice of law (and notwithstanding the handsome legal fees it commands), outcome
prediction in the law remains a very imprecise endeavor.”); see also MICHAELA KEET,
HEATHER HEAVIN & JOHN LANDE, LITIGATION INTEREST AND RISK ASSESSMENT: HELP YOUR
CLIENTS MAKE GOOD LITIGATION DECISIONS xxi (2020) (explaining why “lawyers and parties
often make errors” in their assessment of litigation risk).
323. See supra Section III.E (discussing the time and expense involved in claim valuation
for purposes of TPLF investments).
324. A court could rely on experts or a special master for this purpose, but the potential
increase in accuracy would come at a cost in both money and potential delay.
325. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992).
326. Increasing the number of buckets would shift this balance to favor greater flexibility
and precision, while decreasing the number of buckets would shift the balance in favor of
greater administrability and predictability. Reducing the number of buckets to one would be
equivalent to a uniform risk multiplier approach. See infra Section IV.C.

2020]

F EE -S H I FT I N G S TA TU T ES

1069

to try to settle cases in which they have an 80% likelihood of failure (especially
because, by settling at an early stage of the litigation, they can constrain the plaintiff’s
lodestar value).327 The other buckets would thus have less of an impact on courtordered fee-shifting awards than on the settlement negotiations that occur in the
shadow of the law. In the latter context, the 20% and 80% buckets would act like
guideposts, limiting the parties’ leverage to seek multipliers above 2.5 or below 1.25.
4. Expected Value of Accepting Representation
The Supreme Court in Dague, like some other courts and commentators, assumed
that a case-specific approach would require setting the multiplier to the exact inverse
of the risk presented by a particular case.328 In keeping with that assumption, the
Court expressed concern that a case-specific approach would create the same
incentive for attorneys to bring high-risk cases as low-risk ones.329 Case-specific
multipliers, however, need not take an exact-inverse approach nor create those
incentives. For example, under the approach discussed here, the lowest-risk cases
would have the highest expected-value fees:330
Table 2: Expected Value Associated with Each Probability and Multiplier Value
Initial probability of
complete success
20%
50%
80%

Risk multiplier
2.5
1.8
1.25

Expected value of
representation
50% of lodestar
90% of lodestar
100% of lodestar

When a law firm will be paid only upon success, it must consider not only the fee
that could result from a potential representation, but also the likelihood of obtaining

327. Because the lodestar value depends on the number of hours expended on the litigation,
it is lower at earlier stages of a particular case. Moreover, even in the absence of settlement, a
defendant can sometimes limit its fee exposure by making an offer of judgment. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 68 (governing offers of judgment). If the plaintiff ultimately recovers a judgment less
favorable than the unaccepted offer, the defendant will not be liable for any attorney’s fees
incurred after the offer was made. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
328. Dague, 505 U.S. at 563 (assuming that a claim with a 20% chance of success would
require a multiplier of 5, and that a claim with an 80% chance of success would require a
multiplier of 1.25); see also supra Sections II.B–C.
329. Dague, 505 U.S. at 563 (objecting that risk multipliers would “provide attorneys with
the same incentive to bring relatively meritless claims as relatively meritorious ones”); see
also supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text (noting that this objection assumes risk
neutrality, rather than risk aversion, on the part of the law firm considering whether to
represent the claimant).
330. For accessibility purposes, I note that the table describes an expected value of 50% of
the lodestar for cases with a 20% initial probability of complete success and a risk multiplier
of 2.5, an expected value of 90% of the lodestar for cases with a 50% initial probability and a
risk multiplier of 1.8, and an expected value of 100% of the lodestar for cases with an 80%
initial probability and a risk multiplier of 1.25.
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that fee.331 The expected values listed in this table reflect the role the latter plays in
case selection decisions.332
If a case were to have an initial probability of complete success greater than 80%,
the 1.25 multiplier value would result in an expected value in excess of the
lodestar.333 This potential approach assumes that such cases would be filed so rarely
that courts could reasonably treat them as nonexistent.334 More generally, it reflects
the conclusion that the risk multiplier should have a floor as well as a ceiling,335
because “no claim has a 100% chance of success”336 and risk-bearing services have
positive value. In the unlikely event that law firms were discovered to be routinely
taking certain cases on contingency while charging only their standard noncontingent
rates (or while charging a total fee amounting to less than 125% of those standard
rates), the lower bound could be waived or lowered in cases of that type.
In cases judged to have less than an 80% initial probability of complete success,
these multiplier values would be insufficient to make a risk-neutral law firm
indifferent to the risk presented by the particular case, as the third column of this
chart suggests. Put differently, law firms would have a greater incentive to take on
higher-probability cases than to take on lower-probability cases. The below-lodestar
expected values associated with the other two buckets, under which law firms would
have a greater financial incentive to represent paying clients than to represent feeshifting clients, are the price of those incentives. The expected values reflect not only
a concession to concerns about encouraging high-risk claims,337 but also a
recognition of the federal judiciary’s general parsimony when it comes to
compensating plaintiffs’ counsel.338

331. See supra Section III.B (discussing the role of likelihood of success in case selection
decisions in the context of contingent percentage fees).
332. This table reflects two simplifying assumptions. First, the expected-value calculation
assumes that cases can only completely succeed or completely fail. See supra note 131.
Second, it treats the lodestar as a value that does not depend on a case’s likelihood of success.
See supra Section I.B.
333. For example, if a case had a 90% probability of success, the expected value of the fee
would be L * 0.90 * 1.25 = 1.125L, or 112.5% of the lodestar. (This calculation uses the same
simplifying assumptions discussed earlier, see supra note 332.)
334. Cf. J.B. Heaton, The Siren Song of Litigation Funding, 9 MICH. BUS. &
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (“There are, to put it simply, an overwhelming
number of ways that litigants can lose and far fewer paths to significant victories. . . . Even in
the best of circumstances, one can probably rarely reach a level of certainty as high as 80% on
a litigation outcome, and certainty that high should be rare indeed.”).
335. For a discussion of the appropriateness of a ceiling, see supra note 309.
336. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 563 (1992); cf. id. at 565 (arguing that
contingency enhancements, if adopted, could not “be restricted to fewer than all contingentfee cases”); Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 725
(1987) (plurality opinion) (“Because it is difficult ever to be completely sure that a case will
be won, enhancing fees for the assumption of the risk of nonpayment would justify some
degree of enhancement in almost every case.”).
337. See supra Section II.C; see also Hylton, supra note 28, at 1115–16 (arguing that,
because subsidization increases the volume of the subsidized activity, case-specific risk
multipliers would lead to an increase in the filing of “risky claims” of a similar type).
338. See supra Section II.D; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 232, at 834 (describing
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This potential approach would thus represent a dramatic improvement over the
status quo, but it would still involve some degree of undercompensation. Claimants
would still have to rely on public-spiritedness to fill in the gaps, and some would still
be left without representation, even though they would have prevailed if
representation had been available. Unless courts are willing to accept the costs of
exact-inverse multipliers, however, they will have to “acknowledge that a predictable
number of babies are inevitably going to get thrown out along with all that bath
water.”339
C. Uniform Risk Multipliers
A uniform multiplier, set in advance and applicable to one or more specified feeshifting statutes or types of claims, would address many of the concerns expressed
by the Supreme Court in Dague, including the administrability and judicial economy
concerns discussed above in connection with case-specific multipliers.340 A uniform
multiplier would be very straightforward to add to the existing lodestar approach,341
requiring only that courts multiply the lodestar by a predetermined number.342
Moreover, unlike a multiplier set to the exact inverse of the case’s likelihood of
success, it would preserve law firms’ greater incentives to take cases with less
apparent risk than to take cases with more apparent risk.343 A uniform multiplier
would also avoid arbitrariness in distinctions among cases, and (for those cases
commenced after the relevant multiplier value was announced) it would avoid the
uncertainty for parties and their counsel that could result from a case-specific
approach.344
The Court in Dague objected that a uniform multiplier could not effectively
“mirror[] market incentives,”345 and, notwithstanding the opinion’s flaws, that
particular aspect of the Court’s reasoning has been borne out: the contexts examined

lodestar multipliers in common-fund cases as “fairly parsimonious for the risk that goes into
any piece of litigation”).
339. Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An Essay on
Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65, 68 (1996) (making this assertion in connection
with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
340. See supra Section II.C.
341. To be sure, the process of determining the hours worked and hourly rate components
of the lodestar can be far from straightforward, but the process of applying one predetermined
multiplier to the lodestar would be trivially easy. If courts were to apply different multipliers
to different fee-shifting statutes (or types of claims), greater complexity would be involved in
cases that involved more than one of those statutes (or types of claims).
342. Cf. City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 566 (1992) (objecting that risk
multipliers “would make the setting of fees more complex and arbitrary, hence more
unpredictable”).
343. Cf. id. at 562–63 (objecting that risk multipliers would “provide attorneys with the
same incentive to bring relatively meritless claims as relatively meritorious ones”). But see
supra Section I.A (noting the possibility of sacrifice offers and strategic capitulation, which
can disrupt the connection between probability of success and probability of fee eligibility).
344. For further discussion of the value of a uniform multiplier, see Leubsdorf, supra note
33, at 501–04; Rowe, supra note 28, at 632.
345. Dague, 505 U.S. at 564.
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in Part III support the proposition that the market value of risk-bearing services
generally depends on case-specific factors. A uniform multiplier would still draw on
the lessons of the market, however, with regard to the difficulty and expense
associated with evaluating the risk initially presented by a particular case.346
If the concerns associated with case-specific risk multipliers lead to a choice
between adopting uniform multipliers or providing no compensation for risk at all,347
then uniform multipliers are by far the better option. Because fee-shifting statutes are
designed to fill a market gap, absolute fidelity to the private market is unwarranted;
as the Court in Dague put it, “[i]t is neither necessary nor even possible for
application of the fee-shifting statutes to mimic the intricacies of the fee-paying
market in every respect.”348 Instead, as the Seventh Circuit once put it, “the best we
can hope for in awarding attorney’s fees is rough justice.”349
Because perfection is unachievable, the real question is how to allocate the costs
of imprecision.350 Under the current prohibition on compensation for risk, plaintiffs
bear the cost of undercompensation in all federal statutory fee-shifting cases, because
all cases involve some degree of risk.351 By contrast, a uniform risk multiplier would
cause defendants to bear the costs of imprecision in some cases (i.e., those with a
below-threshold level of risk), but it would cause plaintiffs to bear the costs of
imprecision in the others (i.e. those with an above-threshold level of risk). Making
this choice so as not to allocate all of the costs to the successful plaintiff—“the chosen
instrument of Congress to vindicate a policy that Congress considered of the highest

346. See supra Section III.E (discussing the costly and time-consuming due diligence
conducted by TPLF providers).
347. Cf. Rowe, supra note 28, at 633–34 (objecting to using “criticisms of one way of
handling contingency enhancements as grounds for not allowing them at all”) (emphasis in
original).
348. Dague, 505 U.S. at 566–67.
349. Williams v. Rohm & Haas Pension Plan, 658 F.3d 629, 637 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing In
re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 629 F.3d 741, 748 (7th Cir. 2011)).
350. Cf. Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV.
U.L. REV. 287, 302 (2010) (arguing, in the context of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
that “[s]ince perfect accuracy is impossible, the only sensible goal is to achieve optimal
accuracy, or more precisely, an optimal risk of outcome error”).
351. Dague, 505 U.S. at 563; see also supra Section I.B.
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priority”352—seems like the far better option.353 From a cost-allocation standpoint,
uniform multipliers would thus be superior to a prohibition on compensation for risk.
The uniform multiplier could be set so as to encourage only those cases with a
minimum likelihood of success. For example, John Leubsdorf once suggested that
courts might “simply multiply all fee awards by two, on the theory that the promise
of doubled fees would encourage the bringing of suits with at least an even chance
of success.”354 Alternatively, the multiplier could be tied to plaintiffs’ overall success
rate in civil litigation over some specified period of time. Those success rates have
hovered around 30% for the past two decades,355 suggesting that this approach might
result in a multiplier closer to 3. As a variation on this alternative, a set of uniform
multipliers could be based on plaintiffs’ success rates with respect to particular types
of claims over some specified period of time. For example, plaintiffs won about 8.1%
of adjudicated civil-rights-employment cases in 2016,356 suggesting that this
approach would result in a high uniform multiplier value for that type of claim.
If courts want to ensure that all costs of imprecision fall on plaintiffs rather than
defendants, they could achieve that result by setting the uniform multiplier at a point
corresponding to the lowest possible level of risk. For the reasons explained
previously,357 a multiplier value of 1.25 is a reasonable candidate for that lower
bound. While far from ideal, using this lower bound as a uniform multiplier would

352. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 434 U.S. 412, 418
(1978) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
353. Charles Silver has made a compelling argument to this effect:
The price of avoiding the problem completely, which Justice Scalia
accomplished [in Dague] by eliminating contingency enhancements, is to place
all victims who have only fee awards to offer at a disadvantage in the competition
for lawyers’ time. Why is it better to pay that price than to require defendants
found guilty of violating federal laws to pay marginally more in fees than the risk
of nonpayment warrants? Why should the interest guilty defendants have in
saving money trump the interest plaintiffs with meritorious claims have in
retaining counsel? Guilty defendants can often avoid liability for fees entirely by
refraining from wrongful conduct. Those who fail to do so have little standing to
complain. Guilty defendants can also protect themselves by making offers of
judgment, lump-sum settlement offers, and settlement offers that waive, reduce,
or cap their liability for fees. Again, it is hard to work up much sympathy for
defendants who let these opportunities slip by. Finally, the primary purpose of
fee award statutes is to help plaintiffs with meritorious claims obtain relief from
guilty defendants. It is therefore better to construe the statutes in a manner that
creates incentives for lawyers to represent plaintiffs who have sufficiently strong
claims than to worry about protecting defendants who violate federal laws from
marginal overpayments.
Silver, supra note 28, at 328–29.
354. Leubsdorf, supra note 33, at 474–75.
355. Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman, The Curious Incident of the Falling Win
Rate: Individual vs System-Level Justification and the Rule of Law, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1371, 1373 (2019).
356. Id. at 1426.
357. See supra Section IV.B.4.
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still be an improvement on the status quo, as it would provide reasonable
compensation in the subset of cases involving the lowest level of litigation risk.
CONCLUSION
In a range of contexts—including state fee-shifting statutes, private-market
contingent percentage fees, class action common-fund awards, alternative fee
arrangements, and third-party litigation funding—courts and markets regularly
provide compensation for risk-bearing services associated with plaintiff-side
litigation.358 It is past time for courts to provide that compensation under federal feeshifting statutes as well. This Article has set forth some options for doing so while
attending to potential concerns about overpayment, perverse incentives, and judicial
economy.359 Those concerns need not (and should not) result in the denial of
compensation for risk altogether.360

358. See supra Part III.
359. See supra Part IV.
360. Cf. Rendine v. Pantzer, 661 A.2d 1202, 1228 (N.J. 1995) (acknowledging “concerns
about overpayment and double-counting” and concluding that those concerns should be
“address[ed] . . . by the standards that we adopt to guide the award of contingency
enhancements”).

